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FREE SPEECH AND PARITY: A THEORY OF PUBLIC
EMPLOYEE RIGHTS
RANDY J. KOZEL* 
ABSTRACT
More than four decades have passed since the U.S. Supreme Court
revolutionized the First Amendment rights of the public workforce.
In the ensuing years the Court has embarked upon an ambitious
quest to protect expressive liberties while facilitating orderly and
efficient government. Yet it has never articulated an adequate theo-
retical framework to guide its jurisprudence.
This Article suggests a conceptual reorientation of the modern
doctrine. The proposal flows naturally from the Court’s rejection of
its former view that one who accepts a government job has no consti-
tutional right to complain about its conditions. As a result of that
rejection, the bare fact of government employment is insufficient to
undermine a citizen’s right to free speech. The baseline norm is in-
stead one of parity between government workers and other citizens.
To justify a deviation from the default of parity, there must be a
meaningful reason beyond the employment relationship itself for
viewing government officials as situated differently from their peers
among the general public.
In reframing the jurisprudence around the legitimate bases for
differential treatment of public employees and other citizens, parity
theory outfits the modern doctrine with a firmer conceptual ground-
ing. The theory also provides a method for addressing flaws that
plague the existing law in its practical application. Perhaps most
importantly, parity theory highlights a critical factor that has played
an unduly limited role in the cases to date: the institutional mission
of government instrumentalities.
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INTRODUCTION
During the middle of the twentieth century, in the wake of im-
passioned debates over the conflicting threats posed by Communist
ideology and governmental efforts to suppress it, the United States
Supreme Court reset the First Amendment rights of the public
workforce. The Court expressly abandoned its former position that
because citizens lack any entitlement to public employment, they
also lack grounds for challenging employment conditions as uncon-
stitutional.1 In so doing, it created space for a new theoretical
framework to emerge.
The passage of time has made the treatment of public employee
speech all the more significant. The vast scope of government within
the modern American economy has magnified the impact of se-
lecting one rule of decision over another.2 And the technology-fueled
melding of the personal and professional spheres has heightened
both the stakes and the degree of difficulty.3 All the while, the doc-
trine of public employee speech has remained stunted. The Supreme
Court has fleshed out certain elements of its jurisprudence and
amassed a growing body of case law,4 but its project has been mini-
malist, nibbling around the conceptual margins. The Court has yet
to resolve the single most important issue raised by its doctrinal
overhaul: if it is incorrect to view public employees as relinquishing
their First Amendment rights by virtue of their employment, what
is the correct theoretical alternative?
1. See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
2. Cf. William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1461 (1968) (“Holmes’ conclusion that there is ‘no
constitutional right to be a policeman’ may have been influenced by the comparatively small
economic role played by governmental units in 1892.”).
3. See, e.g., Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Free Speech Rights of Off-Duty Government
Employees, 2010 BYU L. REV. 2117, 2163 (“In the age of the Internet and other electronic
technologies, it is more common than ever before for employees to engage in non-work-related
expression while they are technically on the job.... With the pervasive use of electronic
technology, like cell phones and the Internet, employees often perform work-related functions
while they are not at work.”); Paul M. Secunda, Blogging While (Publicly) Employed: Some
First Amendment Interpretations, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 679, 687 & n.45 (2009).
4. See infra Part I.
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In rejecting the position that government workers possess no
First Amendment rights against their employers—a position cap-
tured in Holmes’ famous statement that a policeman has a right to
“talk politics,” but not to “be a policeman”5—the Court created a
theoretical void. With the Holmesian model discarded, an acute
need arose for a new framework to guide the doctrine’s evolution.
Rather than developing such a framework, however, the Court
became enmeshed in a troublesome balancing test directed at the
various costs and benefits of restricting speech.6 More than forty
years ago, the Court announced that the purpose of employee-
speech law is to promote free expression while authorizing restric-
tions when efficiency so demands.7 The ensuing decades have wit-
nessed the construction of a multi-faceted doctrinal edifice around
that refrain, with less attention paid to how the refrain itself
coheres with First Amendment principles.8
This is not to suggest the Court has been silent about the doc-
trine’s theoretical moorings. Most often, it has noted that when the
government acts as an employer, interests such as operational
efficiency carry added sway,9 reflecting the overarching theme that
First Amendment ideals must be imposed with regard for the
“practical realities of government employment.”10 Notwithstanding
their superficial appeal, statements like these require unpacking
before their premises can be accepted. There must be some expla-
nation of why the government’s desire to operate efficiently can
consistently trump the free-speech rights of a government employee
but not the rights of her peers among the general citizenry. There
also must be some justification for permitting the firing of a gov-
ernment employee based on the provocative nature of his speech,
notwithstanding  the bedrock principle that audience disapproval
is not a legitimate basis for suppressing expression. More generally,
the overarching question is why First Amendment ideals should
bend to the practical realities of the government workplace rather
than vice versa. In this respect, the complexity surrounding
5. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892).
6. See infra Part I.
7. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
8. See infra Part I.
9. See, e.g., Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 675 (1994) (plurality opinion).
10. Id. at 672.
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public-employee speech represents one facet of a larger jurispruden-
tial difficulty created by the application of a sovereign-oriented
Constitution to entities that frequently operate through nonsov-
ereign means.
This Article suggests a conceptual reorientation aimed at ad-
dressing these issues. The proposal flows from the Court’s emphatic
rejection of the Holmesian approach to employee rights. As a result
of that rejection, the bare fact of government employment is no
longer sufficient to impair the exercise of a citizen’s right to free
speech. The baseline norm must instead be one of parity between
government workers and other citizens. In order to deviate from the
presumption of parity and impose a restriction on public employees
that would be unlawful if applied to other citizens, the government
may not rest on the mere existence of the employment relationship.
That approach accompanied the Holmesian model to the ash heap.
Nor may the government rely on operational disruption and audi-
ence reaction without providing a rational account of why those
considerations—which are commonly trumped by the virtues of
expressive liberty in the ordinary course of First Amendment ad-
judication—are infused with unique potency when applied to public
workers. Overcoming the norm of parity requires a meaningful
reason beyond the employment relationship itself for viewing public
officials as situated differently than their peers.
In reframing the jurisprudence around the bases for differential
treatment of those who do and do not work for the government,
parity theory provides a method for addressing structural flaws in
the existing law. Most notable is the Supreme Court’s driving focus
on operational efficiency and the disruptive consequences of em-
ployee speech. In the post-Holmesian world, it is improper to
privilege efficiency interests at the expense of free speech simply
because the institutional context has shifted from government-as-
sovereign to government-as-employer. Likewise, the modern doc-
trine’s implicit acceptance of a “heckler’s veto”11—which withdraws
constitutional protection from speech that is likely to provoke
fervent opposition—is problematic as a matter of First Amendment
principle. At the same time, the parity touchstone demonstrates the
11. See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
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validity of certain elements of existing law, namely the treatment
of speech made in the discharge of an employee’s official duties.
Perhaps the most critical lesson of parity theory is the need to
confront a factor that has played an unduly limited role in the cases
to date: the institutional mission of government instrumentalities.
Assessing employee speech through the lens of parity suggests that
an employee is situated differently from his peers, and thus legit-
imately subject to restriction, when his speech contradicts his
employer’s institutional mission. In such cases, the employee’s
statement provides an evidentiary basis for doubting his ability or
willingness to contribute to the employer’s essential reason for
existence. Equally important, the parity-based approach demon-
strates that an employer should not have license to discipline em-
ployees for speech outside its institutional mission simply because
that speech reflects controversial views or provokes a heated public
response. By redirecting the analysis of employee speech from
operational disruption and audience reaction to institutional mis-
sion and fitness for government employ, parity theory outfits the
employee-speech doctrine with a firmer conceptual grounding.
This Article begins in Part I by analyzing the operation of the
modern doctrine of employee speech before contending in Part II
that the doctrine remains undertheorized. In Part III, the Article
describes the parity-based theory of employee speech as the most
natural successor to the Court’s previous approach. Part IV then
addresses the ramifications of parity theory for the modern doctrine,
including an emphasis on institutional mission and the evidentiary
value of speech. 
One methodological point is in order. This Article does not engage
the predicate question of whether the Court’s rejection of the
Holmesian approach was proper. It assumes arguendo that the
Court was correct in determining that the acceptance of a govern-
ment job does not foreclose one’s First Amendment right to speak as
a citizen. The Article’s project is to explore the implications of the
Court’s conclusion for the theory and doctrine of employee speech.
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I. THE EMPLOYEE-SPEECH CONTINUUM
Despite the complexities in their application, the general prin-
ciples that shape the modern doctrine of employee speech can be
identified with relative ease. What materializes is a continuum of
discourse ranging from speech made pursuant to one’s duties as a
public employee, all the way to speech having nothing to do with
one’s job.
A. Speaking as an Employee
Among the clearest rules within the employee-speech canon is
that when an employee’s job duties require him to speak, his words
are not protected from restriction or discipline. Expressions in
discharge of official duties are treated as derivative of, and integral
to, the speaker’s professional obligations. In such cases, the sensi-
tivities and trade-offs commonly associated with First Amendment
disputes fall away, affording supervisors wide managerial discre-
tion.
The Supreme Court announced this rule in Garcetti v. Ceballos,
decided in 2006.12 Garcetti involved a deputy district attorney who
doubted the validity of a search warrant linked to a pending case.13
He concluded that an affidavit used to obtain the warrant “con-
tained serious misrepresentations.”14 The attorney informed his
supervisors of his judgment through multiple means, including a
memo recommending that the case be dismissed.15 The supervisors
rejected his recommendation and allegedly took retaliatory employ-
ment actions against him.16 
The Court of Appeals determined that the attorney’s “allegations
of [police] wrongdoing ... constitute[d] protected speech under the
First Amendment.”17 The Supreme Court reversed,18 holding that
12. 547 U.S. 410, 421-22 (2006).
13. Id. at 413-14.
14. Id. at 414.
15. Id. 
16. Id. at 415.
17. Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2004).
18. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 426.
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“when public employees make statements pursuant to their offi-
cial duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their
communications from employer discipline.”19 The attorney “did not
act as a citizen when he went about conducting his daily profes-
sional activities,”20 and the same analysis applied to his dismissal
memo.21 The Court concluded that its “precedents do not support the
existence of a constitutional cause of action behind every statement
a public employee makes in the course of doing his or her job.”22
Though Garcetti represented the Court’s first direct engagement
with expressions in discharge of official responsibilities, the major-
ity pointed to several precedents as supporting its central distinc-
tion between speaking as a citizen and speaking as an employee.23
Among them was Pickering v. Board of Education, decided in 1968.24
The speaker in Pickering was a teacher who wrote to a local news-
paper to comment on a proposed tax increase.25 His letter criticized
school administrators for their handling of prior revenue-raising
proposals.26 The letter ultimately led to the teacher’s termination,
and the case worked its way to the Supreme Court.27
19. Id. at 421.
20. Id. at 422.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 426. For commentary criticizing Garcetti, see, for example, Cynthia Estlund,
Free Speech Rights that Work at Work: From the First Amendment to Due Process, 54 UCLA
L. REV. 1463, 1474 (2007) (“The Garcetti ruling denigrates both the individual and the public
interests in favor of public employers’ interest in unfettered control over employees’ job
performance.... [P]ublic employers might game the system to the detriment of both employees
and the public.”); Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control
of Its Workers’ Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 31 (2009) (“Garcetti fails
to recognize that expression constitutes government speech exempt from First Amendment
scrutiny only when it enhances listeners’ ability to evaluate their government.”). For a
contrary view, see Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First Amendment Law of Managerial
Prerogative, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 38 (2008) (“[I]f the First Amendment were understood
to require that all speech-related disputes between public employees and their superiors be
referred to binding arbitration overseen by the judiciary, then politically accountable officials
would be denied effective control over public institutions, a result that would seriously
compromise the First Amendment’s commitment to ensure that the functioning of public
institutions be subject to effective political accountability.”).
23. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 417.
24. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
25. Id. at 564.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 564-65.
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The Court in Pickering underscored its disapproval of the notion
that “teachers may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the
First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to
comment on matters of public interest.”28 Yet the Court cautioned
that, although some degree of First Amendment protection must
remain even for those who accept employment with the government,
“the State has interests as an employer ... that differ significantly
from those it possesses in connection with ... the citizenry in
general.”29 According to Pickering, the judicial task is to balance
government employers’ need for efficient operations against the
value of protecting a public employee who speaks “as a citizen” on
“matters of public concern.”30 
The Court resolved Pickering in favor of the speaker, concluding
that, because “the fact of employment [was] only tangentially and
insubstantially involved” in his letter, he must be treated akin to a
“member of the general public.”31 As the Court would explain some
fifteen years later, Pickering’s focus on the rights of employees to
speak as citizens on matters of public concern “was not accidental.”32
One byproduct of the distinction between acting as a citizen and
acting as an employee would eventually be formalized as the rule of
decision in Garcetti: an employee who speaks in discharging his
official duties is not expressing himself as a citizen for purposes of
free-speech analysis, so he has no grounds for a First Amendment
claim against his employer.33 
B. Speaking as a Citizen
Garcetti established expressions in discharge of official duties as
one endpoint on the employee-speech continuum. That endpoint is
associated with no First Amendment protection against adverse
28. Id. at 568 (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479 (1960); and Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952)).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 574.
32. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983).
33. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006); see also id. at 422 (“When he went to
work and performed the tasks he was paid to perform, Ceballos acted as a government
employee. The fact that his duties sometimes required him to speak or write does not mean
his supervisors were prohibited from evaluating his performance.”).
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employment actions.34 The Supreme Court’s cases also teach that
when a speaker expresses himself as a citizen rather than an
employee, the possibility of constitutional protection exists.
Protection may even extend to utterances made inside the work-
place, so long as they reflect the speaker’s own expressive impulses
rather than an employment-related mandate. Though the “manner,
time, and place” of the expressions play a role in the analysis,35 a
public employee does not necessarily “forfeit[ ] his protection” simply
because he “decides to express his views privately rather than
publicly.”36 The dividing line between speaking as a citizen and
speaking as an employee depends not on physical setting, but on the
speaker’s reasons for expressing himself.
Once it is determined that an employee spoke in his capacity as
citizen,37 the inquiry turns to two additional factors: whether the
speech addressed a matter of “public concern”38 and whether the
value of the speech outweighs the employer’s interest in regulating
it.39
34. Throughout this Article, my references to First Amendment protection relate only to
protection from restriction or discipline by a government employer. Speech may provide a
permissible basis for employer discipline while nevertheless constituting “protected speech”
in the broader sense of the term. See, e.g., Connick, 461 U.S. at 147 (“We in no sense suggest
that speech on private matters falls into one of the narrow and well-defined classes of
expression which carries so little value, such as obscenity, that the State can prohibit and
punish such expression by all persons in its jurisdiction.”).
35. Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415 n.4 (1979) (“When a gov-
ernment employee personally confronts his immediate superior, the employing agency’s
institutional efficiency may be threatened not only by the content of the employee’s message
but also by the manner, time, and place in which it is delivered.”).
36. Id. at 414; see also Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388-89, 391-92 (1987)
(affording protection for comments made at the workplace). But see Connick, 461 U.S. at 153
(“[T]he fact that Myers, unlike Pickering, exercised her rights to speech at the office supports
Connick’s fears that the functioning of his office was endangered.”).
37. For guidance on how to make this finding, see Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424-25 (“The
proper inquiry is a practical one. Formal job descriptions often bear little resemblance to the
duties an employee actually is expected to perform, and the listing of a given task in an
employee’s written job description is neither necessary nor sufficient to demonstrate that
conducting the task is within the scope of the employee’s professional duties for First
Amendment purposes.”).
38. E.g., Connick, 461 U.S. at 146 (“Pickering, its antecedents, and its progeny lead us to
conclude that if Myers’ questionnaire cannot be fairly characterized as constituting speech on
a matter of public concern, it is unnecessary for us to scrutinize the reasons for her
discharge.”).
39. There is also some uncertainty in the case law as to whether the conventional analysis
applies to speech that is completely unrelated to the speaker’s employment. That issue is
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1. The Public Concern Requirement
The Supreme Court briefly noted the relevance of an employee’s
commenting on matters of public concern in Pickering,40 but the
issue did not assume its current form until fifteen years later in
Connick v. Myers.41 The dispute in Connick involved an Assistant
District Attorney who had recently been informed of an impending
transfer.42 After expressing her opposition to the move, the attorney
drafted a questionnaire addressing issues that ranged from office
morale to “whether employees felt pressured to work in political
campaigns.”43 She circulated the questionnaire among her col-
leagues, and the District Attorney terminated her employment
shortly thereafter.44
In concluding that the firing was lawful, the Supreme Court
staked out a distinction between workplace disputes and the
broader public dialogue.45 Embracing the “common-sense realization
that government offices could not function if every employment deci-
sion became a constitutional matter,”46 the Court found that most
of the items on the questionnaire did not “fall under the rubric of
matters of ‘public concern.’”47 Topics such as office morale and con-
fidence in supervisors were simply “extensions of [the attorney’s]
dispute over her transfer.”48 As a result, those issues did not war-
rant any First Amendment protection.49 The Court contrasted the
addressed below. See infra Part IV.D.
40. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (referring to the importance of
protecting commentary “upon matters of public concern”).
41. 461 U.S. 138 (1983); see Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The
Perils of an Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 8 (1990)
(“Pickering need not be read, and was not generally read, as prescribing a threshold public
concern test. To the contrary, under Pickering, the extent to which the employee’s speech
implicated important public issues was only one element in the equation.”).
42. Connick, 461 U.S. at 140.
43. Id. at 141.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 143.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 148.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 149; see, e.g., Paul M. Secunda, Whither the Pickering Rights of Federal
Employees, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1101, 1109 (2008) (“If the court determines that the speech
merely involved purely private interests, like an employment dispute with one’s supervisors,
then there is no First Amendment protection for the speech, because it does not implicate the
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attorney’s workplace complaints against her question about per-
ceived pressure to participate in political campaigning, which did
rise to the level of public concern: “[O]fficial pressure upon employ-
ees to work for political candidates not of the worker’s own choice
constitutes a coercion of belief in violation of fundamental constitu-
tional rights.”50 The questionnaire’s inquiry into that issue accord-
ingly laid the groundwork for a First Amendment claim.51
By expanding the “public concern” language of Pickering into a
full-fledged, independent requirement for constitutional protection,52
Connick raised serious theoretical questions. One item of particular
interest is how to justify cordoning off such a large category of
expression from the First Amendment’s ambit—especially given
that nonemployees commonly enjoy protection for speech that is
narrowly cabined to their private interests rather than directed
toward the greater pursuit of societal understanding.53 This anom-
aly foreshadows the value of parity theory as a tool for analyzing
and refining the existing doctrine.54 But we must defer that dis-
cussion to consider a more immediate task inherent in the Connick
formulation: structuring the process by which reviewing courts—not
core concerns of the First Amendment.”).
50. Connick, 461 U.S. at 149; see also id. (“In addition, there is a demonstrated interest
in this country that government service should depend upon meritorious performance rather
than political service.”).
51. The Court recently clarified that the public concern requirement also applies to
employee-speech disputes that are framed as involving the First Amendment’s Petition
Clause, which protects “the right of the people ... to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I; see Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2497
(2011) (“Employees should not be able to evade the rule articulated in the Connick case by
wrapping their speech in the mantle of the Petition Clause.”).
52. See Estlund, supra note 41, at 8; Paul M. Secunda, The (Neglected) Importance of
Being Lawrence: The Constitutionalization of Public Employee Rights to Decisional Non-
Interference in Private Affairs, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85, 100 (2006) (“The 1983 case of Connick
v. Myers ... gave the Pickering balancing test an important, and ambiguous, gloss.”).
53. Cf. Borough of Duryea, 131 S. Ct. at 2498 (“Outside the public employment context,
constitutional protection for petitions does not necessarily turn on whether those petitions
relate to a matter of public concern.”).
54. See infra Part IV.
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to mention employees and supervisors55—are expected to distin-
guish public concern speech from other expressions.56
Connick indicates, and subsequent cases reaffirm, a comprehen-
sive approach to the public concern inquiry. There must be a fact-
intensive exploration of “the content, form, and context of a given
statement, as revealed by the whole record.”57 Recognizing the
formidable scope of this mandate,58 the Court has offered some
guiding principles. It has characterized topics of public concern as
“relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the
community.”59 It has also explained that “public concern is some-
thing that is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject
55. See Estlund, supra note 41, at 49 (“Ultimately, in the few fully litigated cases, the
decisionmaker may be a judge. But the potential public-employee speaker must be equally,
if not more, concerned with the decision made by her employer and her employer’s counsel
whether to fire her.”); Randy J. Kozel, Reconceptualizing Public Employee Speech, 99 NW. U.
L. REV. 1007, 1027 (2005) (“Which speech is of public concern is difficult to guess ex ante....
How was [the speaker in Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987),] to know whether her
speech was of public concern before she spoke? And how was her employer to determine
whether her statement, or the context of her discussion, or some combination of the statement
and context brought her statement to the level of public concern?”); Lawrence Rosenthal,
Permissible Content Discrimination Under the First Amendment: The Strange Case of the
Public Employee, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 529, 557 (1998) (stating with respect to the public
concern test that “[s]tandardless regulation of speech creates an impermissible risk that the
government will use its discretion as a pretext to engage in otherwise forbidden content or
viewpoint discrimination”).
56. See Estlund, supra note 41, at 23 (“Connick thrust the federal courts into the business
of deciding on a case-by-case basis which messages implicated matters of public concern and
which did not.”).
57. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983); cf. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207,
1216 (2011) (“In considering content, form, and context, no factor is dispositive, and it is
necessary to evaluate all the circumstances of the speech, including what was said, where it
was said, and how it was said.”).
58. See, e.g., City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83 (2004) (per curiam) (acknowledging
that “the boundaries of the public concern test are not well defined”); see also Snyder, 131 S.
Ct. at 1216 (confirming that City of San Diego’s statement regarding doctrinal uncertainty
“remains true today”); Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 692 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment) (noting the “difficulties courts already encounter ... in determining whether
speech pertains to a matter of public concern”). For other criticisms of the public concern test,
see, for example, Estlund, supra note 41, at 3 (“The public concern test will generate, by the
inexorable operation of stare decisis, a judicially approved catalogue of legitimate subjects of
public discussion. That prospect alone should condemn the entire undertaking, for the
Constitution empowers the people, not any branch of the government, to define the public
agenda.”); Rosenthal, supra note 55, at 531 (“The evolution of the law in this area has been
unsatisfactory for both employers and employees.”).
59. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146.
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of general interest and of value and concern to the public at the time
of publication.”60 The Court has also drawn on another doctrine in
which public concern assessments play a role, namely the common
law tort for invasion of privacy.61 And it has emphasized that the
“inappropriate or controversial character of a statement is irrele-
vant to the question whether it deals with a matter of public
concern.”62
Whatever its precise contours, the public concern requirement
garners its force from drawing content-based distinctions between
different types of speech.63 Public concern speech is contrasted, first,
with employment grievances. The Court has emphasized that “the
First Amendment does not require a public office to be run as a
roundtable for employee complaints over internal office affairs.”64 By
separating employment disputes from other expressions, the cases
teach that, when it comes to job-related grievances, “government
officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices,
without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First
Amendment.”65 
Another content-based distinction encompassed within the public
concern requirement involves speech of little or no societal value. An
60. City of San Diego, 543 U.S. at 83-84.
61. See id. at 83 (“[T]he standard for determining whether expression is of public concern
is the same standard used to determine whether a common-law action for invasion of privacy
is present.” (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 143 n.5)).
62. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 387 (1987); cf. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1217 (“While
[the expressions at issue] may fall short of refined social or political commentary, the issues
they highlight ... are matters of public import.”).
63. Cf. Rosenthal, supra note 55, at 531 (“The Connick public concern test allows judges
to decide which topics are of proper public concern and which disputes should remain in the
workplace. This test seemingly confers upon judges censorial power that the First
Amendment ordinarily forbids: the power to discriminate against speech on the basis of its
content.”). Contra, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“Content-based
regulations are presumptively invalid.”).
64. Connick, 461 U.S. at 149; see also Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488,
2493 (2011) (“If an employee does not speak as a citizen, or does not address a matter of public
concern, ‘a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a
personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee’s behavior.’”
(quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 147)).
65. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146; cf. Borough of Duryea, 131 S. Ct. at 2496 (“Employees may
file grievances on a variety of employment matters, including working conditions, pay,
discipline, promotions, leave, vacations, and terminations.... Every government action in
response could present a potential federal constitutional issue” in a world of “[u]nrestrained
application of the Petition Clause.”).
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opinion from 2004 is illustrative. In City of San Diego v. Roe, the
Court considered whether a police officer was entitled to constitu-
tional protection for sexually explicit videos he distributed over the
Internet that referenced his field of employment.66 The Court had
“little difficulty in concluding that the City was not barred from
terminating” the officer.67 The videos did “nothing to inform the
public about” the speaker’s employer and bore no resemblance to
comments about “political news” previously deemed to address
matters of public concern.68 It followed that the videos could not
qualify for potential First Amendment protection “under any view
of the public concern test.”69
City of San Diego illustrates how sharply the public concern
requirement can deviate from general First Amendment principles
regarding the valuation of speech.70 In examining “the content, form,
and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record,”71
a reviewing court must determine whether the statement appeals
to the “general interest” and provides public value.72 This consider-
ation is irreducibly normative, and it ventures well beyond any
attempt to separate speech that is related to employment from
speech that is not. Of course, the valuation of speech in cases like
City of San Diego might seem unobjectionable due to the particular
expressions at issue. But the Court’s rationale cannot be reliably
cabined to speech that most of us would agree has little or no
worth.73
66. 543 U.S. at 78-79.
67. Id. at 80.
68. Id. at 84.
69. Id.
70. Cf. Estlund, supra note 41, at 37 (“[T]he Connick version of the public concern test
explicitly discounts the importance, and undermines the claim to constitutional status, of
speech grounded in the real, everyday experience of ordinary people.”).
71. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983).
72. City of San Diego, 543 U.S. at 84.
73. For a justification of the public concern test grounded in public-choice theory, see
Daniel A. Farber, Commentary, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First
Amendment, 105 HARV. L. REV. 554, 575 (1991) (“If ... the employees’ speech does not concern
some matters of public significance, the information conveyed by the speech has little spillover
effect outside the office and hence has scant claim to protection.”).
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2. The Pickering Balance
For expressions that satisfy the public concern standard, the issue
of First Amendment protection is resolved through the balancing
approach articulated in Pickering.74 A reviewing court will under-
take the challenging task75 of weighing the employer’s need to exert
managerial control against the virtues of affording protection to
employee speech.76 On the employer’s side of the scale, the Pickering
balance is notable for its focus on operational efficiency.77 Pickering
described the key governmental interest as “promoting the efficiency
of the public services it performs through its employees,”78 and the
Court’s subsequent opinions evince a similar emphasis.79 As dis-
cussed in Part III, this willingness to compromise free expression
for the sake of governmental efficiency is striking; in the ordinary
course, it would be unusual to accord so much weight to conven-
ience and smooth operations at the expense of speech.80 One might
74. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); see also, e.g., Secunda, supra note 49,
at 1109 (“[I]f the speech relates to a matter of public concern not connected to a public
employee’s official duties, a court then undertakes a Pickering balance of interests test.”).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union (NTEU), 513 U.S. 454, 482
(1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“Balancing
is difficult to undertake unless one side of the scale is relatively insubstantial.”); Connick, 461
U.S. at 150 (“Although such particularized balancing is difficult, the courts must reach the
most appropriate possible balance of the competing interests.”).
76. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. The burden rests with the government. See Rankin v.
McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987) (“The State bears a burden of justifying the discharge
on legitimate grounds.”).
77. See, e.g., Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2494 (2011) (“The
government has a substantial interest in ensuring that all of its operations are efficient and
effective. That interest may require broad authority to supervise.”); NTEU, 513 U.S. at 455
(“[O]perational efficiency is undoubtedly a vital governmental interest.”); Rankin, 483 U.S.
at 388 (“[T]he state interest element of the [Pickering balancing] test focuses on the effective
functioning of the public employer’s enterprise.”).
78. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
79. See, e.g., Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 675 (1994) (plurality opinion) (“The
government’s interest in achieving its goals as effectively and efficiently as possible is
elevated from a relatively subordinate interest when it acts as sovereign to a significant one
when it acts as employer.”); Connick, 461 U.S. at 150 (“The Pickering balance requires full
consideration of the government’s interest in the effective and efficient fulfillment of its
responsibilities to the public.”); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 517 (1980) (“[I]f an employee’s
private political beliefs would interfere with the discharge of his public duties, his First
Amendment rights may be required to yield to the State’s vital interest in maintaining
governmental effectiveness and efficiency.”).
80. See infra Part III.A.
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respond by contending that the employment context represents a
specialized “niche” within First Amendment doctrine that requires
exceptional treatment, including the privileging of efficiency inter-
ests over certain liberties.81 But that is simply a way of restating the
question of what about the employment context justifies a different
set of rules than customarily apply.82
The other side of the scale, relating to the value of protecting
employee expression, initially seems more consistent with estab-
lished norms of First Amendment doctrine. Along with the em-
ployee’s own interest in speaking freely without reprisal, the Court
has noted the importance of a robust marketplace of ideas83 in pro-
moting the public good.84 In practical application, however, the
Pickering balance departs from conventional First Amendment
principles by embracing an overtly content-based approach to
81. See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 22, at 1464 (“First Amendment doctrine is often
institutionally blind—surprisingly oblivious to institutional differences that seem to matter
in the world. But the workplace is an obvious and longstanding counterexample; it is
undoubtedly a distinct ‘constitutional niche.’” (footnote omitted)); cf. Robert C. Post, Between
Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV.
1713, 1768 (1987) [hereinafter Post, Between Governance and Management] (noting that
common situations like a government official’s instruction to her subordinate regarding an
upcoming presentation would be viewed as creating “a first amendment nightmare” outside
the confines of the workplace); Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First
Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267, 317 (1991) [hereinafter Post, Racist Speech] (“If
public discourse is bounded on one side by the necessary structures of community life, it is
bounded on the other by the need of the state to create organizations to achieve explicit public
objectives. These organizations, which are nonpublic forums, regulate speech in ways that are
fundamentally incompatible with the requirements of public discourse.”).
82. Cf. Waters, 511 U.S. at 671 (plurality opinion) (“What is it about the government’s role
as employer that gives it a freer hand in regulating the speech of its employees than it has in
regulating the speech of the public at large?”).
83. Cf. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(describing the “theory of our Constitution” as providing that “the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market” and stating that
“when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe
even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas”).
84. See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006) (“The Court has acknowledged
the importance of promoting the public’s interest in receiving the well-informed views of
government employees engaging in civic discussion.”); City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77,
82 (2004) (per curiam) (“The interest at stake is as much the public’s interest in receiving
informed opinion as it is the employee’s own right to disseminate it.”); United States v. Nat’l
Treasury Emps. Union (NTEU), 513 U.S. 454, 470 (1995) (“The large-scale disincentive to
Government employees’ expression also imposes a significant burden on the public’s right to
read and hear what the employees would otherwise have written and said.”).
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protection. In the Court’s words, “the State’s burden in justifying a
particular discharge varies depending upon the nature of the
employee’s expression.”85 Valuation can even entail resuscitating the
public concern test in a modified form: “a stronger showing may be
necessary [to justify a governmental restriction] if the employee’s
speech more substantially involved matters of public concern.”86
Once the comparative assessment of costs and benefits has been
conducted, the core analysis of First Amendment protection is
complete.87 If the balance is struck in favor of the speaker, he will
be permitted to express himself with full insulation from retal-
iation.88 If the employer wins out, the subject expressions may be
restricted even if they rise to the level of citizen-speech on matters
of public concern.89 Connick provides a useful illustration. Though
the Court found that one of the items on the speaker’s questionnaire
addressed an issue of public concern,90 it nevertheless concluded
that “[t]he limited First Amendment interest involved here does not
require that [the supervisor] tolerate action which he reasonably
believed would disrupt the office, undermine his authority, and
85. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983); cf. Jonathan C. Medow, The First
Amendment and the Secrecy State: Snepp v. United States, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 775, 816 (1982)
(“Implicit in Pickering seems to be a determination that ‘reasonableness’ is the standard by
which to judge the conditioning of public sector employment on a relinquishment of some
measure of first amendment rights.”).
86. Connick, 461 U.S. at 152. For an interesting take on the Court’s “stronger showing”
language, see Post, Between Governance and Management, supra note 81, at 1814 n.351 (“I
think the most plausible interpretation of Connick is that [when employee speech directly
implicates matters of public concern] the government cannot depend upon judicial deference
to managerial anticipation of harm to institutional culture, but must instead bring sufficient
evidence before a court to convince it that the government’s restriction of speech is in fact
necessary for the attainment of institutional goals.”).
87. There also remain important questions of causation and proof. See Secunda, supra
note 49, at 1107-10.
88. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 399 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“We are
asked to determine whether ... McPherson had a right to say what she did—so that she could
not only not be fired for it, but could not be formally reprimanded for it, or even prevented
from repeating it endlessly into the future.”).
89. See, e.g., Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 675 (1996) (“[E]ven
termination because of protected speech may be justified when legitimate countervailing
government interests are sufficiently strong.”); cf. Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct.
2488, 2500 (2011) (“When a public employee petitions as a citizen on a matter of public
concern .... [i]f the interference with the government’s operations is such that the balance
favors the employer, the employee’s First Amendment claim will fail.”).
90. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 149.
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destroy close working relationships.”91 Connick demonstrates that
regardless of whether employee speech is of legitimate interest to
the public, it can be restricted if it poses too great a threat to gov-
ernmental efficiency. This risk provides further evidence of the
difference in kind between the Supreme Court’s particularized
vision of the government workplace and its conventional ideal of an
uninhibited public discourse92 in which the provocative impact of
speech is, in all but the rarest situations,93 insufficient to warrant
suppression.94
C. Synthesis
As the foregoing overview suggests, the Supreme Court’s existing
doctrine essentially divides employee-speech cases into two broad
categories. When an employee speaks as a citizen on matters of
public concern and his speech does not impair his employer’s oper-
91. Id. at 154.
92. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011) (“The First Amendment
reflects ‘a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.’” (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964))); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (describing the First Amendment as
“fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
social changes desired by the people”); Robert C. Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2363 (2000) (“The theory of the
marketplace of ideas focuses on ‘the truth-seeking function’ of the First Amendment. It
extends the shelter of constitutional protection to speech so that we can better understand the
world in which we live.” (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988)));
Jeremy Waldron, Dignity and Defamation: The Visibility of Hate, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1596,
1639 (2010) (“Left to themselves, free markets may generate efficient outcomes by processes
that economists say they understand. And analogously, it is said (though without any
analogous explanation), in the long run the free marketplace of ideas will generate truth or
the acceptance of truth if it is left to its own devices.”).
93. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (recognizing an
exception to constitutional protection for incitement of imminent lawless action); Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (recognizing an exception to constitutional
protection for “fighting” words).
94. See, e.g., Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1220 (“As a Nation we have chosen ... to protect even
hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate.”); Hurley v. Irish-
Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 574 (1995) (“[T]he point of all
speech protection ... is to shield just those choices of content that in someone’s eyes are
misguided, or even hurtful.”); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a
bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable.”).
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ations to an extent that overshadows the value of his speech, he will
enjoy constitutional protection.95 By contrast, if the employee speaks
pursuant to his employment obligations, addresses private griev-
ances or matters of limited societal interest, or makes statements
that are more disruptive than valuable, the First Amendment will
not shield him from adverse action.96
Given this rather formidable assemblage of blackletter nuance,
one might assume that the conceptual underpinnings of the em-
ployee-speech doctrine are similarly detailed. In reality, the Court’s
engagement in deeper theoretical analysis has not kept pace with
its issuance of doctrinal guidelines. This phenomenon is examined
below in Part II. Part III then proceeds to offer a theoretical frame-
work to guide the revision and evolution of employee-speech juris-
prudence.
         II. THE HOLMESIAN REJECTION AND THE NEED FOR AN      
ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK
An “unchallenged dogma” of the early twentieth century was that
public employees had no constitutional basis for challenging speech
restrictions imposed as conditions of their employment.97 The
rationale, epitomized by Holmes’s aphorism, was that although a
policeman “may have a constitutional right to talk politics ... he has
no constitutional right to be a policeman.”98 It was not until the
1950s that the Supreme Court departed from this paradigm,
prompted by prevalent efforts “to require public employees, par-
ticularly teachers, to swear oaths of loyalty to the State and reveal
the groups with which they associated.”99 By striking down employ-
ment conditions in those cases, the Court demonstrated its suspicion
95. See supra Part I.B.
96. See supra Part I.A. The Court has taken a distinct approach to employment actions
made on the basis of political party affiliation. See infra note 228.
97. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983).
98. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892); see also, e.g., Adler
v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952) (“It is clear that [government employees] have the
right under our law to assemble, speak, think and believe as they will. It is equally clear that
they have no right to work for the State in the school system on their own terms.” (citation
omitted)).
99. Connick, 461 U.S. at 144.
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of attempts “to suppress the rights of public employees to partici-
pate in public affairs.”100
The Court’s abandonment of the Holmesian view runs parallel to
a transition in its broader thinking about the constitutional di-
mensions of “privileges” as compared to “rights.”101 In modern times
it has become insufficient to assert that, because an employee has
no constitutional right to a government paycheck, his employment
is a mere privilege whose various conditions are beyond the First
Amendment’s purview. Similarly out of favor is the “greater in-
cludes the lesser” theory that the government’s power to rescind a
benefit implies unchecked power to subject the benefit to con-
ditions.102 As applied to the employment context, theories like these
would suggest that the power to fire an employee for no reason
implies the power to fire for any reason, even one that impairs the
freedom of speech. Such arguments are now disapproved.103 Nor
does a public employee’s consent to the terms of a government job
completely neutralize the Constitution’s guarantees. As the Court
100. Id. at 144-45.
101. See Van Alstyne, supra note 2, at 1442 (“While the concept of ‘privilege’ underlying
Holmes’ epigram remains nominally intact, its implications for positive law have been
gradually eroded.”); see also Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 72 (1990) (“[W]e
find the assertion here that the employee petitioners and cross-respondents had no legal
entitlement to promotion, transfer, or recall beside the point.”); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513, 518 (1958) (“The appellees are plainly mistaken in their argument that, because a tax
exemption is a ‘privilege’ or ‘bounty,’ its denial may not infringe speech.”); Estlund, supra note
41, at 16 (“[T]he hoary ‘rights-privileges’ distinction shielded from constitutional scrutiny
loyalty oaths and other requirements of political orthodoxy demanded as a condition for
employment and other valuable government benefits.”).
102. See, e.g., Michael Herz, Justice Byron White and the Argument that the Greater
Includes the Lesser, 1994 BYU L. REV. 227, 245 (“As long as one concedes that some conditions
are unconstitutional, and there is unanimous agreement as to that, though huge
disagreement as to why and which ones, then the greater does not always include the
lesser.”); Secunda, supra note 52, at 96 (“Although most jurists once believed that government
benefits, including public employment, were mere privileges that could be withheld or limited
on any condition, the Supreme Court now emphatically rejects ‘the greater includes the lesser’
premise.” (footnote omitted)).
103. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383-84 (1987) (“Even though McPherson was
merely a probationary employee, and even if she could have been discharged for any reason
or for no reason at all, she may nonetheless be entitled to reinstatement if she was discharged
for exercising her constitutional right to freedom of expression.”); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents,
385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967) (“[T]he theory that public employment which may be denied
altogether may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has been
uniformly rejected.” (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 345 F.2d 236, 239 (2d Cir. 1965))).
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recently noted, “[t]here are some rights and freedoms so fundamen-
tal to liberty that they cannot be bargained away in a contract for
public employment.”104 Freedom of speech is near the top of the
list.105
Though the shift in the Court’s approach to employee speech was
pronounced, we should take care not to overstate it. It has never
been true that government employees and other citizens must be
treated identically in all respects.106 The employment context thus
continues to afford some additional measure of authority to restrict
speech, based on both “the unique nature of the government’s
interest” and “the consensual nature of the employment relation-
ship.”107 The resulting tension links public employee speech to the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, a body of law dealing with
governmental authority to impose “conditions on the receipt of
funds.”108 The unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits the
denial of benefits on grounds that improperly infringe constitutional
rights such as the freedom of speech.109 The central analytical task
104. Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2493 (2011).
105. For an argument that the Court has tacitly reinvigorated the right-privilege
distinction through its recent employee-speech cases, see Paul M. Secunda, Neoformalism and
the Reemergence of the Rights-Privilege Distinction in Public Employment Law, 48 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 907, 909-10 (2011).
106. See, e.g., Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 599 (2008) (“[W]e have often
recognized that government has significantly greater leeway in its dealings with citizen
employees than it does when it brings its sovereign power to bear on citizens at large.”);
Secunda, supra note 105, at 936-37 (“[I]mportant distinctions do remain between when the
government acts as employer as opposed to when it acts in its sovereign capacity.”).
107. Borough of Duryea, 131 S. Ct. at 2494; see also, e.g., Estlund, supra note 22, at 1472
(“[T]he government’s power to regulate employee speech that detracts from its public mission
is built into the employment contracts implicitly agreed to by public employees in accepting
employment.”).
108. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 59 (2006);
see also Kathleen Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1419 (1989)
(“The central challenge for a theory of unconstitutional conditions is to explain why conditions
on government benefits that ‘indirectly’ pressure preferred liberties should be as suspect as
‘direct’ burdens on those same rights, such as the threat of criminal punishment.”); id. at 1490
(“Government freedom to redistribute power over presumptively autonomous decisions from
the citizenry to itself through the leverage of permissible spending or regulation would
jeopardize ... [a] realm of autonomy that should remain free from governmental encroach-
ment.”).
109. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996) (citing Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)); Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Comm’n, 271 U.S.
583, 594 (1926) (“If the state may compel the surrender of one constitutional right as a
condition of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that
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is the same one presented by employee-speech cases:110 drawing the
line between lawful governmental influence and improper govern-
mental overreaching.111
Situating debates about employee speech within this broader
context is helpful in two respects. First, it demonstrates that
employee-speech disputes represent one facet of a larger jurispru-
dential difficulty created by the application of a sovereign-oriented
Constitution to entities that frequently operate through nonsov-
ereign means. Second, the context helps illustrate that the Court’s
abandonment of the Holmes-approved, “no constitutional right to be
a policeman” approach is only part of the story.112 The rejection of
the Holmesian view revealed that a given theory of constitutional
meaning had been rejected. But it also prompted the question of
what alternative theory should be utilized going forward. The Court
has yet to provide a complete answer.
guarantees embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus be manipulated out
of existence.”); Van Alstyne, supra note 2, at 1445-46 (“Essentially, this doctrine declares that
whatever an express constitutional provision forbids government to do directly it equally
forbids government to do indirectly.... The net effect is to enable an individual to challenge
certain conditions imposed upon his public employment without disturbing the presupposition
that he has no ‘right’ to that employment.”).
110. Although the Court often treats employee speech as a stand-alone doctrine, it
occasionally highlights the connection with unconstitutional conditions jurisprudence. See
Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 674; Perry, 408 U.S. at 597 (“[E]ven though a person has no ‘right’ to a
valuable governmental benefit and even though the government may deny him the benefit for
any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not rely....
We have applied this general principle to denials of tax exemptions, unemployment benefits,
and welfare payments. But, most often, we have applied the principle to denials of public
employment.” (citations omitted)).
111. Numerous commentators have grappled with the slippery nature of unconstitutional
conditions doctrine. For a sampling, see Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines:
Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 3 (2001) (“[C]onditional
offers are sometimes constitutionally permissible and sometimes not. Indeed, correctly
understood, that is all the famed and contentious unconstitutional conditions doctrine
holds.”); Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term—Foreword: Unconstitutional
Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1988); Farber, supra
note 73, at 572 (referring to the doctrine as “a notorious conceptual quagmire”); Frederick
Schauer, Too Hard: Unconstitutional Conditions and the Chimera of Constitutional
Consistency, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 989 (1995); Secunda, supra note 52, at 94 (“Although what
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine holds is generally uncontested, specifying the ‘certain
circumstances’ under which the doctrine is thought to apply is a completely different story.”);
Sullivan, supra note 108.
112. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892).
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To illustrate, recall Pickering.113 The case could hardly have been
clearer about the rationale it was dismissing: the anachronistic idea
that “teachers may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish” their
free-speech rights by virtue of their employment.114 Quoting an
opinion issued the year prior, Pickering disavowed the “theory that
public employment which may be denied altogether may be sub-
jected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable.”115 Yet
the Court stopped short of formulating a satisfactory alternative.
Instead, it reaffirmed the government’s unique interests as em-
ployer and left the tension to be sorted out by balancing the costs
and benefits of restricting speech in individual cases.116 
Pickering thus prescribed a wide-ranging balancing test without
furnishing an adequate theoretical grounding. Other than the
sentiments that speech rights and governmental efficiency are both
important, one searches in vain for a conceptual core. If anything,
the opinion is remarkable for its dissonance. As elaborated below,117
the Court described teachers as “the members of a community most
likely to have informed and definite opinions” on matters related to
the school system, making First Amendment protection “essen-
tial.”118 But it also emphasized that protection was warranted be-
cause the speaker’s role as a teacher was “only tangentially and
insubstantially involved in the subject matter” of his speech.119 In
other words, the speaker’s expressions were protected because his
employment gave him a special degree of interest and expertise, and
because his employment was only tangentially involved in his
expressions.
Although employee-speech doctrine has evolved substantially in
the decades since Pickering, the opinion’s theoretical implications
have received insufficient attention in the case law. The most
notable exception is Waters v. Churchill, in which a plurality led by
Justice O’Connor set out to examine what gives government “a freer
hand in regulating the speech of its employees than it has in regu-
113. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
114. Id. at 568.
115. Id. (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967)).
116. Id.
117. See infra Part IV.D.
118. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572.
119. Id. at 574.
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lating the speech of the public at large.”120 The plurality hinted at a
deeper exploration of the issue through its recognition that the
added discretion “comes from the nature of the government’s
mission as employer.”121 Ultimately, though, the plurality ended its
inquiry prematurely, concluding that “[t]he government’s interest
in achieving its goals as effectively and efficiently as possible is
elevated from a relatively subordinate interest when it acts as sov-
ereign to a significant one when it acts as employer.”122 As for why
the government’s efficiency interest becomes capable of trumping
First Amendment rights in the employment context, the plurality
essentially took the point as given, noting the importance of public
services and “the practical realities of government employment.”123
It also made a curious appeal to conventional wisdom by invoking
“the many situations in which, we believe, most observers would
agree that the government must be able to restrict its employees’
speech.”124 Such statements are not answers so much as refor-
mulations of the underlying question. Even accepting that the
efficient provision of public services is a societal and democratic
good, we must consider when and why the First Amendment’s
protections—which so often are interpreted as promoting uninhib-
ited expression even at the expense of orderly operations—should
yield.
III. A PARITY-BASED THEORY OF EMPLOYEE SPEECH
A. The Parity Touchstone
When the Supreme Court abandoned the Holmesian model and
the attendant premise that government workers have no First
Amendment rights against their employers,125 it dramatically
120. 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994) (plurality opinion).
121. Id. at 674.
122. Id. at 675.
123. Id. at 672; see also Kermit Roosevelt, The Costs of Agencies: Waters v. Churchill and
the First Amendment in the Administrative State, 106 YALE L.J. 1233, 1239 (1997) (noting that
the Court’s analysis is “tantalizingly elliptical” in failing to “explain what it is about the
employer-employee relationship that changes the ordinary First Amendment analysis”).
124. Waters, 511 U.S. at 672 (plurality opinion).
125. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006) (“The First Amendment limits the
ability of a public employer to leverage the employment relationship to restrict, incidentally
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altered the constitutional relevance of the employment relationship.
Under the Holmesian approach, that relationship had been para-
mount. From the principle that government workers have no
entitlement to their jobs, it followed that the workers had no
constitutional grounds for complaint about any speech restrictions
their employers saw fit to impose.126
Once the Court abandoned the Holmesian approach, the fact of
employment necessarily took on a different complexion. The employ-
ment relationship itself was no longer sufficient to dispose of First
Amendment claims. But uncertainty remained as to the role it
would now play in the constitutional calculus. One possibility is that
the Court implicitly moved to something like a middle ground
between the Holmesian approach and full First Amendment pro-
tection: though it is incorrect to say that public workers possess no
expressive liberties enforceable against their employers, the
workers nevertheless have relinquished some of their rights by
virtue of their employment. This understanding, though, is problem-
atic. If the bare fact of employment is insufficient to discharge the
entirety of a government worker’s First Amendment rights, it is
difficult to see how the same fact could be viewed as discharging
some unspecified subset of those rights. To be sure, there may be
situations in which the performance of professional duties entails
deviation from ordinary principles of free speech. But those devia-
tions are not justified by reference to the employment relationship
itself. Rather, and as discussed below, they stem from particular
circumstances that may or may not be applicable to any given
employee working for any given public institution.
The second possibility for understanding the theoretical fallout of
the Supreme Court’s shift is more defensible, and it forms the basis
or intentionally, the liberties employees enjoy in their capacities as private citizens.”); City
of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80 (2004) (per curiam) (“A government employee does not
relinquish all First Amendment rights otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by reason of his or
her employment.”); Waters, 511 U.S. at 674 (plurality opinion) (“[A] government employee, like
any citizen, may have a strong, legitimate interest in speaking out on public matters.”);
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140 (1983) (“[A] public employee does not relinquish First
Amendment rights to comment on matters of public interest by virtue of government
employment.”); id. at 147 (“Our responsibility is to ensure that citizens are not deprived of
fundamental rights by virtue of working for the government.”); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391
U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
126. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
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for this Article’s central claim. By rejecting the Holmesian view and
its singular focus on the existence of an employment relationship,
the Court rendered that fact irrelevant to the constitutional
calculus. No longer is it sufficient to answer the question, “Why do
I have weaker First Amendment rights than my peers?” with the
response, “Because you work for the government.” The default norm
of differential constitutional status for government employees as
compared to other citizens has given way. What emerged instead is
a default of parity: employees and other citizens are presumed to be
similarly situated for purposes of the First Amendment. This
presumption is a natural corollary of repudiating the theory that
government employment itself provides a legitimate justification for
imposing restrictions on the freedom of speech.127
It does not follow that employees’ and nonemployees’ First
Amendment rights must be identical. There are valid reasons why
employees must tolerate certain restrictions that would be unlawful
if applied to other citizens.128 But those reasons are derived from
sources other than the mere fact of employment—sources with the
explanatory power to justify bending the First Amendment rules
that normally apply. Parity theory thus suggests that the doctrine
of employee speech should be reoriented around a single inquiry: Is
there a valid reason for permitting the government to treat the
employee differently from her peers in the citizenry at large?
The contours of this parity-based model can be further defined by
contrasting it with the branch of unconstitutional conditions juris-
prudence that deals with a condition’s “germaneness” or “related-
ness” to the government’s zone of lawful discretion. In Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission, for example, the Supreme Court
disapproved a condition that required two homeowners to grant a
127. Pickering contains one passage that nicely captures the importance of thinking in
terms of parity: “In these circumstances we conclude that the interest of the school
administration in limiting teachers’ opportunities to contribute to public debate is not
significantly greater than its interest in limiting a similar contribution by any member of the
general public.” Pickering, 391 U.S. at 573.
128. Kermit Roosevelt, for example, has explored several ways in which government
employees are situated differently from nonemployees that might arguably be relevant to
First Amendment doctrine. See Roosevelt, supra note 123, at 1239-41. Professor Roosevelt’s
focus on identifying meaningful bases for distinction strikes me as exactly right, though his
theory appears less skeptical than mine of governmental arguments based on considerations
such as intraoffice harmony.
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public easement across their property in exchange for a develop-
ment permit.129 The Court noted that if the government could deny
the permit without violating the Takings Clause,130 it could also
impose a “permit condition that serves the same legitimate police-
power purpose.”131 But it could not insist on a condition that “utterly
fail[ed]” to support the rationale for denying a permit outright.132
That latter sort of condition would resemble a law that “forbade
shouting fire in a crowded theater, but granted dispensations to
those willing to contribute $100 to the state treasury.”133 The consti-
tutional distinction, the Court explained, turned on the closeness of
connection between the condition imposed and the government’s
legitimate discretion.134
Parity theory suggests that such an approach should not extend
to the domain of public employee speech. In the employment con-
text, there often will be reason to believe that an employee’s speech
has a plausible likelihood of affecting his employer through avenues
including impairment of intraoffice harmony and impact on public
perception.135 Pickering and Connick provide ready examples, as do
129. 483 U.S. 825, 827-39 (1987).
130. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.”).
131. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836.
132. Id. at 837.
133. Id.
134. Id.; see also, e.g., Renee Lettow Lerner, Unconstitutional Conditions, Germaneness,
and Institutional Review Boards, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 775, 775 (2007) (“In a number of U.S.
Supreme Court cases dealing with unconstitutional conditions, the Court has examined the
nexus between the condition and the government’s purpose in making the expenditure, known
as germaneness. If the nexus is attenuated or nonexistent, the Court has held that the
condition is improper.”); Sullivan, supra note 108, at 1457 (describing the germaneness
inquiry as focusing on “the degree of relatedness between the condition on a benefit and the
reasons why government may withhold the benefit altogether”). Another useful illustration
of the relatedness/germaneness inquiry comes from South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
Compare id. at 208 (“[T]he condition imposed by Congress is directly related to one of the
main purposes for which highway funds are expended—safe interstate travel.”), with id. at
215 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“When Congress appropriates money to build a highway, it is
entitled to insist that the highway be a safe one. But it is not entitled to insist ... that the
State impose or change regulations in other areas of the State’s social and economic life
because of an attenuated or tangential relationship to highway use or safety.”).
135. Cf. Epstein, supra note 111, at 67-68 (“[T]oday unconstitutional conditions issues tend
to be raised with respect to restrictions relatively germane to the work at hand: the terms and
conditions of individual employment contracts. The very statement of the doctrine suggests
that most cases in this area satisfy the ‘relatedness’ requirement that Justice Scalia spelled
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a host of other Supreme Court cases.136 Yet speech by nonemployees
regularly creates significant consequences for governments, and still
the First Amendment remains steadfast. The inquiry that parity
theory proposes is whether there is a meaningful basis, apart from
the fact of employment, for treating a government employee dif-
ferently from his peers among the general citizenry.137 Germaneness
analysis is a mechanism for ensuring that the government does not
overreach in its use of conditions;138 parity theory recognizes that
even a restriction that is reasonably related to the employer’s func-
tions may be unlawful absent an adequate basis for singling out
government employees.
B. Parity in the Modern Law
Parity-based thinking is not entirely foreign to the existing law
of employee speech.139 Speech made in discharge of an employee’s
official responsibilities currently receives no constitutional protec-
tion from employer control.140 Such speech is said to “owe[ ] its
existence” to the speaker’s employment.141 If the speaker were not
employed by the government, or if he were not tasked with certain
out in Nollan.”).
136. See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006); City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S.
77 (2004) (per curiam); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987); Givhan v. W. Line Consol.
Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
137. For other discussions emphasizing the closeness of connection between speech
restrictions and employer needs, see, for example, Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 490 (1960)
(“The statute’s comprehensive interference with associational freedom goes far beyond what
might be justified in the exercise of the State’s legitimate inquiry into the fitness and
competency of its teachers.”); Van Alstyne, supra note 2, at 1462 (describing a theory under
which “an employee’s job interest” would be protected against “unreasonable regulation,”
meaning regulation lacking “a sufficient connection with an adequately compelling public
interest”).
138. See, e.g., Dole, 483 U.S. at 218 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[A] condition that a State
will raise its drinking age to 21 cannot fairly be said to be reasonably related to the
expenditure of funds for highway construction.... Rather than a condition determining how
federal highway money shall be expended, it is a regulation determining who shall be able to
drink liquor.”).
139. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418 (“The question becomes whether the relevant government
entity had an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other
member of the general public.”).
140. See id. at 421-22; supra Part I.A.
141. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
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communications as part of his official duties, his expressions would
not have come into existence in the first place. 
That causal origination overcomes the presumption of parity,
authorizing the government to treat the speaker differently than a
nonemployee.142 Speech required by an employee’s official duties has
“no relevant analogue to speech by citizens who are not government
employees.”143 The same analysis would apply, for example, to a
public employee’s rude or vulgar speech to customers.144 Though
citizens have the right to speak coarsely and even offensively in
conducting their private lives, an employee’s professional interac-
tions with patrons are derivative of and unique to the employment
context.145 Government employers may legitimately exert control
over the shape of those exchanges without violating the norm of
parity.146 The converse is that when employees “make public state-
ments outside the course of performing their official duties,” the
prospect of First Amendment protection arises because “that is the
kind of activity engaged in by citizens who do not work for the gov-
ernment.”147
IV. PARITY AND DOCTRINAL REFORM
Notwithstanding the foregoing example of overlap between parity
theory and the modern doctrine, more prevalent are the points of
divergence. In this Part, I examine the areas of employee-speech law
in which a parity-based approach suggests the need for revision and
elaboration. 
142. See id. at 422-23 (“Official communications have official consequences creating a need
for substantive consistency and clarity. Supervisors must ensure that their employees’ official
communications are accurate, demonstrate sound judgment, and promote the employer’s
mission.”).
143. Id. at 424.
144. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 (1994) (plurality opinion) (“[S]urely a public
employer may, consistently with the First Amendment, prohibit its employees from being
‘rude to customers,’ a standard almost certainly too vague when applied to the public at
large.”).
145. See id. at 672.
146. See id. (“[W]e have never expressed doubt that a government employer may bar its
employees from using [an] offensive utterance to members of the public or to the people with
whom they work.”).
147. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423.
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A. Rethinking Public Concern
The language of “public concern” has come a long way from its
usage in Pickering.148 The concept of public concern was prominent
in that case,149 though an argument could be made that it was pri-
marily a descriptor underscoring the interests of government em-
ployees in contributing to the public discourse and of society in re-
ceiving those contributions.150 Regardless, Connick v. Myers erased
any doubt regarding the importance of public concern, treating it as
an additional requirement for First Amendment protection.151 The
Court’s more recent cases have continued to mine the concept for
meaning, even finding a license for evaluating employee speech
against a backdrop of judicially determined legitimacy: “[P]ublic
concern is something that is a subject of legitimate news interest;
that is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the
public at the time of publication.”152
Reassessed through the lens of parity, the public concern test is
problematic. Connick defined public concern speech in contradistinc-
tion to “matters only of personal interest.”153 It is by no means
unprecedented for the Court to depict certain speech as so vital to
148. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
149. See id. (“The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the
teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through
its employees.”); id. at 570 (“[T]o the extent that the Board’s position here can be taken to
suggest that even comments on matters of public concern that are substantially correct ... may
furnish grounds for dismissal if they are sufficiently critical in tone, we unequivocally reject
it.”); id. at 571 (“[T]he question whether a school system requires additional funds is a matter
of legitimate public concern on which the judgment of the school administration, including the
School Board, cannot, in a society that leaves such questions to popular vote, be taken as
conclusive.”); id. at 574 (“This Court has also indicated ... that statements by public officials
on matters of public concern must be accorded First Amendment protection despite the fact
that the statements are directed at their nominal superiors.”).
150. See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 41, at 8.
151. 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983) (“Pickering, its antecedents, and its progeny lead us to
conclude that if Myers’ questionnaire cannot be fairly characterized as constituting speech on
a matter of public concern, it is unnecessary for us to scrutinize the reasons for her
discharge.”); see also Estlund, supra note 41, at 8 (“[W]hat was, in Pickering the announced
purpose for protecting public employee speech became the minimum threshold for gaining
protection in Connick.”).
152. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83-84 (2004) (per curiam).
153. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147.
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self-government154 that it ought to be viewed as occupying the
“highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values”155 and
“entitled to special protection.”156 But in the employee-speech
context, the public concern test entails that such expressions are the
only ones that may receive protection.157 The operation of the First
Amendment depends on whether the expressions at issue can “be
fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or
other concern to the community.”158
Parity theory highlights the need for a reason beyond the bare
fact of employment to justify differential treatment of employees
as opposed to other citizens, and no such rationale is available to
explain why employees should be left without protection for expres-
sions of personal interest. Though “speech concerning public affairs”
may indeed be “the essence of self-government,”159 the Court has
never suggested that all other expressions are subject to suppres-
sion.160 The same should be presumptively true of employee speech
and its susceptibility to adverse state action.161 
The Court has defended the public concern requirement on
grounds of practical necessity, invoking “the common-sense real-
ization that government offices could not function if every employ-
154. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964) (“[S]peech concerning public affairs
is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.”).
155. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) (quoting Carey v. Brown,
447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)).
156. Connick, 461 U.S. at 145.
157. See Estlund, supra note 41, at 22 (“Connick represents the debut of explicit
stratification at the upper reaches of the First Amendment.”).
158. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146.
159. Garrison, 379 U.S. at 74-75.
160. See, e.g., Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 95 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“Private citizens cannot be punished for speech of merely private concern.”); see
also First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 n.12 (1978) (“The individual’s interest in
self-expression is a concern of the First Amendment separate from the concern for open and
informed discussion, although the two often converge.”).
161. Cf. Connick, 461 U.S. at 157 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“When public employees engage
in expression unrelated to their employment while away from the workplace, their First
Amendment rights are ... no different from those of the general public.”); Adler v. Bd. of Educ.,
342 U.S. 485, 508 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“I cannot ... find in our constitutional
scheme the power of a state to place its employees in the category of second-class citizens by
denying them freedom of thought and expression. The Constitution guarantees freedom of
thought and expression to everyone in our society.”).
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ment decision became a constitutional matter.”162 Along similar
lines is the Court’s statement that “the First Amendment does not
require a public office to be run as a roundtable for employee com-
plaints over internal office affairs.”163 Yet citizens who do not work
for the government may speak (and complain) about the internal
operations of public instrumentalities with full First Amendment
protection.164 There would not seem to be any meaningful basis of
distinction between those citizens and their peers who work for the
government. Of course, an employee who sought to promote a work-
related grievance while he was supposed to be performing his
official duties would be subject to discipline pursuant to the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Garcetti.165 Likewise, and as explained
below,166 even speech outside an employee’s official duties could
trigger a legitimate employment action if it revealed confidential
information167 or otherwise cast doubt upon the employee’s fitness
for his job.168 Apart from those situations, there is no warrant for
categorically denying protection to work-related speech based purely
on the speaker’s status as a government employee. The parity-based
approach suggests the merits of moving away from the public
concern requirement and toward a focus on more meaningful bases
of distinction between employees and other citizens.
162. Connick, 461 U.S. at 143; see also id. at 149 (“To presume that all matters which
transpire within a government office are of public concern would mean that virtually every
remark ... would plant the seed of a constitutional case.”).
163. Id. at 149.
164. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 672 (1994) (plurality opinion) (“[A] private
person is perfectly free to uninhibitedly and robustly criticize a state governor’s legislative
program.”).
165. Nonconstitutional measures may be available to protect some such speech. See
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006) (referencing “the powerful network of legislative
enactments—such as whistle-blower protection laws and labor codes—available to those who
seek to expose wrongdoing”).
166. See infra Part IV.B-C.
167. Cf. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980) (per curiam) (“[T]his Court’s
cases make clear that ... the CIA could have acted to protect substantial government interests
by imposing reasonable restrictions on employee activities that in other contexts might be
protected by the First Amendment. The Government has a compelling interest in protecting
both the secrecy of information important to our national security and the appearance of
confidentiality so essential to the effective operation of our foreign intelligence service.”
(citations omitted)).
168. See Wales v. Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 82, 84 (7th Cir. 1997).
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B. Balancing, Disruption, and Listener Reaction
Within the universe of the First Amendment, listener disapproval
seldom provides a valid basis for restricting speech.169 This “bedrock
principle”170 extends to speech that is uncivil, upsetting, and offen-
sive.171 Even if a speaker’s words furnish a reasonable and morally
justifiable basis for criticism, that fact is an insufficient reason for
the government to punish him.172 A “necessary cost of freedom,” the
Supreme Court recently reminded us, is that “[m]any ... must
endure speech they do not like.”173 Indeed, protecting speech that
provokes vehement opposition is sometimes described as the highest
purpose of the First Amendment.174 The individual’s right to express
himself in his own terms provides part of the rationale for this
view,175 as does the potential value of even extreme or troubling
169. See, e.g., Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134-35 (1992)
(“Listeners’ reaction to speech is not a content-neutral basis for regulation. Speech cannot be
financially burdened, any more than it can be punished or banned, simply because it might
offend a hostile mob.” (citations omitted)); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978)
(plurality opinion) (“[T]he fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason
for suppressing it. Indeed, if it is the speaker’s opinion that gives offense, that consequence
is a reason for according it constitutional protection.”). The most notable exception is the
doctrine of “fighting words.” See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
170. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying
the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”).
171. See, e.g., Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (noting that restricting
speech requires a justification “far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest”);
Rosenthal, supra note 22, at 71 (“First Amendment doctrine has never treated speech as
unprotected because others find it offensive or harassing.”); cf. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S.
378, 387 (1987) (“The inappropriate or controversial character of a statement is irrelevant to
the question whether it deals with a matter of public concern.”).
172. Cf. Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARV.
L. REV. 84, 85 (1998) (“Much of the very idea of free speech depends on ignoring what might
otherwise appear to be politically and morally relevant features of speakers and speeches.”).
173. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2669 (2011).
174. See, e.g., Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4 (“[A] function of free speech under our system of
government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a
condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people
to anger.”).
175. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (“[W]ords are often chosen as
much for their emotive as their cognitive force. We cannot sanction the view that the
Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech, has little or no
regard for that emotive function which, practically speaking, may often be the more important
element of the overall message sought to be communicated.”); see also Hurley v. Irish-Am.
Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995) (“[T]he fundamental rule
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viewpoints in contributing to the marketplace of ideas.176 In the
words of Robert Post, speech that causes a “visceral shock” may
serve a “constructive purpose” by leading listeners “to acknowledge
the claims of others from radically different cultural back-
grounds.”177 For better or worse, well-established First Amendment
norms require that the government—and the rest of us—bear the
costs of extreme and disruptive speech as a means of achieving
these perceived benefits.
The balancing test set forth in Pickering178 assumes a markedly
different posture. Through its contemplation of scenarios in which
the disruption caused by speech provides a lawful basis for disci-
pline, the Pickering test can be understood as constitutionalizing a
“heckler’s veto” for controversial expressions.179 Speech that gener-
ates strong criticism from listeners is disruptive by definition, and
avoiding disruption is a leading reason that Pickering and its
progeny offer for permitting the restriction of employee speech.180 By
accepting the legal relevance of audience reaction, the modern doc-
trine also ensures, albeit implicitly, that no employee speech is truly
protected.181 Consider the Supreme Court’s 1995 opinion in United
States v. National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), dealing with
a law prohibiting federal employees from accepting compensation
for various speeches and writings.182 In the course of declaring the
of protection under the First Amendment [is] that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the
content of his own message.”).
176. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 418 (1989) (“The First Amendment does not
guarantee that ... concepts virtually sacred to our Nation as a whole ... will go unquestioned
in the marketplace of ideas.”).
177. Post, Racist Speech, supra note 81, at 304; see also Farber, supra note 73, at 580
(“Society must tolerate a certain amount of rhetoric about revolution and a good deal of
general ‘foaming at the mouth’ to get the other benefits of radicals’ activities. If the market
provided adequate incentives for sane, sensible people to dedicate their lives to the production
of criticisms of society, we could dispense with the contribution of the fanatics and crackpots.
As it is, we must tolerate them—which means in practice that the courts must force people
to put up with a lot of violent rhetoric and nasty talk.” (footnotes omitted)).
178. See supra Part I.B.2.
179. See Kozel, supra note 55, at 1019 (“The core of the employee’s free speech right is
entirely dependent on the likely reaction of co-workers and the public to the employee’s
speech.”).
180. See id. at 1018.
181. See id. at 1021-22 (“By allowing disruption to justify employer restrictions on speech,
the Pickering test fails to afford employee speech any real protection.”).
182. 513 U.S. 454, 457 (1995).
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law unconstitutional as applied to the parties before it, the Court
denied the charge that the doctrinal focus on disruption creates a
bias against disfavored and provocative speech.183 Invoking a hypo-
thetical based on Pickering, the Court explained that a teacher’s
letters supporting his school board would be treated identically to
letters criticizing the board; the driver of protection is not the
viewpoint expressed, but whether disruption is likely to result.184
Even if one accepts this (unconvincing, in my view) claim of view-
point neutrality,185 it is cold comfort. The Court’s statement implies
that every utterance made by a government employee, no matter
how important or valuable, can provide a lawful basis for retaliation
so long as it threatens to create a sufficient stir.
The Court has shown itself more willing to acknowledge a related
anomaly inherent in the Pickering test, one dealing with the para-
mount focus on operational efficiency. The plurality in Waters v.
Churchill acknowledged that “[t]he government cannot restrict the
speech of the public at large just in the name of efficiency.”186 As we
have seen, however, Waters was unable to offer a convincing ration-
ale for perpetuating the inconsistency in the employment contxt,187
and the remainder of the Court’s jurisprudence does little better.
This rhetorical deficiency reflects a deeper, structural problem. The
general concept of disruptiveness is not a meaningful basis for
distinguishing between employees and other citizens. Nonemployee
speakers can and do create serious disruptions and inefficiencies for
governments.188 The First Amendment’s customary response is that
the government must tolerate these consequences in promoting
183. Id. at 467 n.11.
184. Id.
185. See id. at 500 n.6 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (addressing “the Court’s fanciful
example of an employer terminating an employee because of the disruptive effect of the
employee’s expression even where the employer agrees with the expression”).
186. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 675 (1994) (plurality opinion); see also id. at 674
(“[R]estrictions [on employee speech] are allowed not just because the speech interferes with
the government’s operation. Speech by private people can do the same, but this does not allow
the government to suppress it.”); cf. Roosevelt, supra note 123, at 1237 (“By the standards of
ordinary First Amendment praxis, the Waters rule is clearly unconstitutional....
[A]pprehensions of disruption and reduced governmental efficiency cannot outweigh the
fundamental rights protected by the First Amendment.”).
187. See supra text accompanying notes 120-24.
188. See Waters, 511 U.S. at 673-74 (plurality opinion).
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individual liberty and a climate of robust discourse.189 The same
approach presumptively should extend to expressions by public
employees.
The analysis might be different if public employees possessed
some systematically greater ability to create disruptions than their
nonemployee peers. I see little reason to suspect this is the case as
a universal matter. A public school teacher’s letter to the local news-
paper expressing his views about school funding and tax policy
might have ramifications for his employer by inviting public
scrutiny, but the same could be said of letters from other concerned
citizens who do not work for the government. And a clerical worker’s
critical statements about the President might sow discord within
the workplace and exact a toll on institutional efficiency, but costs
also arise when the government must strive to maintain order
during a public speech by a controversial figure.190 Disruption is an
unavoidable—and, some would say, vital—byproduct of the First
Amendment. A mere preference for smooth operations should be no
more capable of trumping free speech in the employment context
than it is in society at large.
The better option is to resist the prevailing notion that govern-
mental efficiency is elevated to the level of paramount interest
within the employment context.191 Instead, the problem should be
viewed through the lens of parity. The reason why the government
may, for example, take actions such as controlling its employees’ use
of confidential information is that government workers receive
access to sensitive data that is not disseminated to nonemployees.
Prohibiting the public release of such data does not infringe any
right that nonemployees could possess, so it takes nothing away
from employees by virtue of their employment alone. Framed in
terms of parity theory, the prohibition tracks a meaningful basis of
189. See Roosevelt, supra note 123, at 1238 (“The government’s greater freedom does not
stem simply from the importance of governmental efficiency. If this were the sole justification,
the government would have no more power to suppress employee speech than it does to
silence private individuals.”).
190. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV.
143, 150 (2010) (“Whether the speaker hands out leaflets or engages in public demonstration,
the public is obliged to pick up the costs of cleaning litter from leaflets thrown on the ground
or providing a police cordon to protect the speaker from a violent response by onlookers.”).
191. See, e.g., Waters, 511 U.S. at 675 (plurality opinion).
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distinction between employees and other citizens, which is the
proper determinant of constitutional protection.
C. Institutional Mission and Expression as Evidence
Up until now, this Article has advanced the claim that the
presumption of parity supports a doctrine of employee speech
organized around the ways in which public employees are situated
differently than other citizens. The Article has discussed instances
in which distinguishing between employees and nonemployees is
warranted, such as when an employee speaks in discharging official
responsibilities.192 It has also addressed factors that are insuffi-
cient to justify differential treatment, such as a hostile audience
reaction.193 The following pages introduce another aspect of the
employee-speech analysis: the relevance of an employer’s institu-
tional mission. Examining the role of mission is necessary to iden-
tify the circumstances in which employees are meaningfully distinct
from nonemployees, and to ensure that an employer’s pursuit of
institutional objectives is not allowed to cast too wide a shadow over
expressive rights.
Institutional mission has played a superficial role in the Supreme
Court’s employee-speech cases to date. A notable example is Waters,
in which the plurality stated that “the extra power the government
has in [the employment] area comes from the nature of the govern-
ment’s mission as employer.”194 But Waters went astray in collapsing
this insight into a preoccupation with operational disruption.195
Parity theory requires a more thorough examination to determine
whether and when an employer’s commitment to pursuing its
192. See supra Part III.B.
193. See supra Part IV.B.
194. Waters, 511 U.S. at 674 (plurality opinion).
195. See id. at 675 (“Agencies hire employees to do [the agencies’] tasks as effectively and
efficiently as possible. When someone who is paid a salary so that she will contribute to an
agency’s effective operation begins to do or say things that detract from the agency’s effective
operation, the government employer must have some power to restrain her.”); supra text
accompanying notes 120-24; cf. Roosevelt, supra note 123, at 1234 (arguing that properly
understood, “governmental efficiency comprehends not only the narrow instrumental interest
recognized by the Court [in Waters] but also a broader societal interest in self-governance,
both of which are served by employee speech”).
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mission can justify restrictions on employee speech that would be
invalid if applied to the public at large.
The government is empowered to espouse certain viewpoints in
its role as sovereign, but it cannot compel private citizens to join in
support of its preferred ideology.196 However ardently the govern-
ment might embrace a particular ideal, it cannot force citizens to
say they agree, nor can it punish them for saying otherwise.
Government employers, by comparison, generally are designed to
involve citizens in pursuing missions197—missions embossed with a
democratic imprimatur.198 The very existence of these institutions
implies the license for a certain amount of control over employee
expression. If a public elementary school is to educate its students,
it must be able to reprimand a teacher who, harboring a sincere
belief that state-run education is an example of illegitimate gov-
ernmental overreaching, sits silently at his desk in a showing of
somber protest. Less fancifully, the same school must have the
ability to oversee the teacher’s presentation of curricular materials,
even at the expense of his expressive liberty. A teacher retains the
right to talk politics in his personal life, but he can be forbidden
from doing so when he is supposed to be instructing his students
196. See, e.g., W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”); id. at 641 (“There is no mysticism in
the American concept of the State or of the nature or origin of its authority. We set up
government by consent of the governed, and the Bill of Rights denies those in power any legal
opportunity to coerce that consent. Authority here is to be controlled by public opinion, not
public opinion by authority.”); Helen Norton, Campaign Speech Law with a Twist: When the
Government Is the Speaker, Not the Regulator, 61 EMORY L.J. 209 (2011) (describing Wooley
v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), as an illustration of the “proposition that the government
retains the power to express its own views and values, so long as it does not force others to
join or share those views”); Post, Racist Speech, supra note 81, at 284 (“[T]he state
undermines the raison d’être of its own enterprise to the extent that it itself coercively forms
the ‘autonomous wills’ that democracy seeks to reconcile into public opinion.”).
197. See Roosevelt, supra note 123, at 1242 (“[G]overnmental agencies are charged by law
with specific tasks.”).
198. See Estlund, supra note 22, at 1472 (“In a sense, democracy itself depends on public
officials being empowered to direct and evaluate how employees perform their jobs. It is all
well and good for voters to elect officials and express policy preferences, but those democratic
processes do not amount to much unless those elected and appointed officials can implement
those policies.”); cf. Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 164 (1996)
(“Managerial domains are necessary so that a democratic state can actually achieve objectives
that have been democratically agreed upon.”).
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about long division.199 A school’s insistence that its teachers present
specified scholastic materials does not represent the sort of demand
for “ideological conformity”200 or suppression of “dangerous ideas”201
from which the First Amendment recoils. It simply reflects an
employer’s effort to exert control over its institutional domain in
pursuit of organizational objectives.202
The examples in the previous paragraph serve as useful starting
points for exploring the relevance of mission. Yet they are best
understood as involving the discharge of official responsibilities, and
we have already seen that such speech is subject to managerial
discretion under a parity-based approach.203 The more difficult
question is whether promotion of institutional mission can authorize
an employer to restrict speech made in an employee’s capacity as
citizen.
It seems to me that the answer is yes. The explanation owes to
the evidentiary value of speech. An employee who makes a state-
ment contravening his employer’s mission does more than introduce
an expressive utterance into the world of ideas. He also provides
evidence that may reveal something about his likely workplace
performance.204 The government ordinarily has no occasion to draw
performance-related inferences from the speech of its citizens. But
199. See Feldman v. Ho, 171 F.3d 494, 496 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[A] public university may sack
a professor of chemistry who insists on instructing his students in moral philosophy or
publishes only romance novels.”); cf. Frederick Schauer, “Private” Speech and the “Private”
Forum: Givhan v. Western Line School District, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 217, 244 (“Regardless of
whether a modern-day McAuliffe might have the right to talk politics on his own time, it is
clear that he could be legitimately dismissed for delivering a political oration when he was
supposed to be directing traffic.” (footnote omitted)).
200. Cf. Rosenthal, supra note 55, at 531-32 (arguing that employee-speech restrictions
“should be considered constitutionally unobjectionable when they require an employee to do
her job consistent with office policies, rather than when they attempt to coerce her ideological
conformity in the workforce”).
201. E.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991) (“This is not a case of the Government
‘suppressing a dangerous idea,’ but of a prohibition on a project grantee or its employees from
engaging in activities outside of the project’s scope.”).
202. See Post, supra note 198, at 164 (“Within managerial domains, the state organizes its
resources so as to achieve specified ends.”).
203. See supra Part III.B.
204. See Kozel, supra note 55, at 1024 (“An employee such as McPherson might well give
her employer useful information about her value to the office by ‘cheer[ing] for the robbers’
when she is supposed to be ‘rid[ing] with the cops,’ even when there is no acute and
demonstrable operational disruption resulting from her speech.” (quoting Rankin v.
McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 394 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting))).
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when the speaker is a government worker, his employer should be
allowed to react to statements that cast doubt upon his fitness for
duty—just as the employer is free to react to other indicators of
performance, such as workplace productivity. The Constitution does
not require that an employee’s speech be disregarded for purposes
of evaluating his suitability and aptitude.
Some inferences about fitness for employment will be relatively
uniform across different institutions. For example, it is well ac-
cepted that a government employer may react to employee speech
that demonstrates functional incompetence to perform assigned
tasks.205 As Judge Easterbrook has put it, the government “as an
abstraction could not penalize any citizen for misunderstanding the
views of Karl Marx or misrepresenting the political philosophy of
James Madison, but a Department of Political Science can and
should show such a person the door.”206 We might imagine a similar
line of analysis for speech that suggests a tendency toward det-
rimental workplace conduct. When an employee states that
“[e]veryone in this office is underpaid and entitled to steal what he
205. See Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 74 (1990) (“A government’s interest
in securing effective employees can be met by discharging, demoting, or transferring staff
members whose work is deficient.”); Wales v. Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 82, 84 (7th Cir. 1997)
(noting that speech can provide “a sound reason for an employer to act” when “it reveals
information relevant to performance on the job”); id. at 85 (“What people say reflects or
presages what they do, and employers (public and private alike) therefore may properly
consider job-related speech when making decisions.”); Papandrea, supra note 3, at 2166
(“Although an employee’s off-duty, non-work-related speech should be entitled to a strong
presumption of constitutional protection, the government employer must be given the
authority to suppress or punish that speech when the speech reveals that the employee is
unfit to perform his job duties.”); Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Public Employee Speech Rights
Fall Prey to an Emerging Doctrinal Formalism, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1173, 1185 (2007)
(“[I]f the employee’s speech indicated his incompetence or unfitness for the assigned work
responsibilities, the government employer’s interest in efficiently providing services to the
public routinely outweighed the expressive rights at issue.”); Schauer, supra note 199, at 229
(noting that under Pickering, employee speech “is covered, but it is not protected ... if it can
be shown to call into question the teacher’s competence as a scholar or teacher”); id. at 243
(“I have the right to believe that the world is flat or that astrology tells us more than the
theories of Newton and Einstein. I also have the right to express these views to anyone foolish
enough to listen. But if I am the head of the physics department at a major state research
university, I can hardly deny that such public utterances might validly cause my superiors
to wonder if perhaps I am in the wrong line of work and to take appropriate action.”).
206. Feldman v. Ho, 171 F.3d 494, 496 (7th Cir. 1999); cf. Schauer, supra note 111, at 995
(“[P]ublic endorsement of astrology might be thought relevant to hiring or retaining a physics
teacher.”).
2026 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1985
can,”207 his employer should be permitted to infer that the employee
is unfit for government work without waiting for corroborating
evidence in the form of actual theft. Perhaps the inference is
misguided, and the employee is actually a dedicated and successful
worker who was blowing off steam after a grueling day. But making
that determination should be committed to the discretion of the
employer, who is better positioned than the courts to determine the
appropriate conclusion to be drawn from the employee’s statement.
For First Amendment purposes, the salient point is that the
employee’s statement meaningfully sets him apart from his fellow
citizens, who owe no support to his employer’s institutional mission.
It is important to recognize that this rationale for permitting the
restriction of employee speech operates independently of any hostile
reaction among the listening audience.208 The proper referent is not
the impact of the speech qua speech, but the information the speech
provides about its speaker.209 The government-as-sovereign is
neither required nor permitted to assess the suitability of its
207. Wales, 120 F.3d at 85 (internal quotation marks omitted).
208. Several commentators have noted the potential impact that a government employee’s
speech might have on his interactions with the public, often invoking the example of law
enforcement officers. See David E. Bernstein, The Red Menace, Revisited, 100 NW. U. L. REV.
1295, 1321 (2006) (“Few would argue with the proposition that it is important that African
American victims of crimes and criminal suspects think that police officers treat them
fairly.”); Rosalie Berger Levinson, Silencing Government Employee Whistleblowers in the
Name of “Efficiency,” 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 17, 21 (1996) (“[E]mployees who take controversial
positions on certain topics ... (i.e. white supremacy, sexism, anti-semitism) may find that their
ability to interact with the public and to perform their job is adversely affected by their
speech.”); Norton, supra note 22, at 60-61 (“Police officers’ racist speech that undermines
confidence in the agency’s declared commitment to evenhanded enforcement may be especially
threatening in light of such agencies’ equal protection obligations along with historic and
continuing concerns about the role of race in the administration of justice.”); Rosenthal, supra
note 55, at 582 (“A police officer who is an avowed racist, for example, creates special
problems if he is sent on patrol.”). I would suggest that arguments like these be reformulated
in terms of the evidence speech provides about the employee’s fitness and performance rather
than audience reaction.
209. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573 n.5 (1968) (“We also note that this case
does not present a situation in which a teacher’s public statements are so without foundation
as to call into question his fitness to perform his duties in the classroom. In such a case, of
course, the statements would merely be evidence of the teacher’s general competence, or lack
thereof, and not an independent basis for dismissal.”). Jed Rubenfeld has drawn a distinction
along related lines between consequences imposed “for speaking” versus consequences
imposed “as a result of” speaking. Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN.
L. REV. 767, 777 (2001) (“Whether a person is being punished for speaking, rather than as a
result of it, depends on the kind of wrong or harm that the state seeks to prevent.”).
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citizens against some ideological baseline. But the government-as-
employer must constantly evaluate its employees’ performance and
aptitude if it has any hope of achieving its institutional objectives.
Employee speech will sometimes furnish evidence that supplements
the evaluative process. When it does, parity theory does not require
employers to look the other way.
Raising the prospect of discipline based on employees’ intrinsic
qualities and beliefs makes it imperative to identify effective con-
straints on managerial discretion. Too capacious a conception of the
institutional mission could lead to undue interference with employ-
ees’ “freedom to believe and associate.”210 In the worst-case scenario,
the result would be a world in which “the organizational role of
employee [was] defined so pervasively as to destroy the constitu-
tional role of citizen,”211 enabling governments to mold their ex-
tensive workforces “into a common intellectual pattern.”212 The rec-
ognition that public institutions are vital for the achievement of
democratic objectives does not assuage these concerns.213 There
remains the challenging task of determining how the scope of insti-
tutional objectives should be identified, articulated, and appropri-
ately cabined.
Parity theory provides a framework for fashioning a solution to
this problem. A government employer may prefer that its employ-
ees always refrain, even when off the clock, from criticizing the
President, commenting on divisive social issues, or using foul
language. But the government does not receive so broad a mandate
simply by virtue of assuming its employer role. What makes the
210. Rutan, 497 U.S. at 76 (“The First Amendment prevents the government, except in the
most compelling circumstances, from wielding its power to interfere with its employees’
freedom to believe and associate, or to not believe and not associate.”); cf. Borough of Duryea
v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2495 (2011) (“[T]he right to speak fosters the public exchange
of ideas that is integral to deliberative democracy as well as to the whole realm of ideas and
human affairs.”); Post, Racist Speech, supra note 81, at 285 (“[B]ecause public discourse is
understood as the communicative medium through which the democratic ‘self ’ is itself
constituted, public discourse must in important respects remain exempt from democratic
regulation.”).
211. Post, Between Governance and Management, supra note 81, at 1815.
212. Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 497 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).
213. Cf. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2828
(2011) (“[T]he whole point of the First Amendment is to protect speakers against unjustified
government restrictions on speech, even when those restrictions reflect the will of the
majority. When it comes to protected speech, the speaker is sovereign.”).
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government-as-employer different from the government-as-sover-
eign is the former’s authorization to enlist citizens in pursuit of
specific institutional objectives.214 Only when an employee’s speech
casts doubt on his willingness or ability to promote those objectives
is the presumption of parity overcome. In the post-Holmesian era,
government employers are foreclosed from using the allure of
public employment to create a perfectly docile and like-minded
workforce.215 Yet an employer retains a distinctive license to ensure
that its workforce is contributing to the ends it was assembled to
achieve.
To illustrate the bounds of institutional mission, consider Givhan
v. Western Line Consolidated School District.216 In that case, a
teacher was disciplined after raising concerns about the racial
impact of various practices within her school.217 Under a parity-
based approach, the teacher’s statements did not provide a valid
basis for inferring that she was unfit for her job. Whatever the
precise contours of the mission of the public schools—an issue we
will revisit shortly—they do not include a demand for silence in the
face of policies one views as racially discriminatory. Much the same
is true of the teacher in Pickering.218 A school board might prefer
that its teachers refrain from criticizing its budgetary decisions,
even in their off-the-clock expressions. But such criticism does not
provide any basis for inferring that the speaker lacks suitability for
or dedication to the public schools’ legitimate mission.219
For another example, let us build from Justice Scalia’s dissent in
Rankin v. McPherson by imagining an attorney at the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) who, on his own
time and using his own website, espouses the personal conviction
214. See supra text accompanying notes 197-207.
215. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 385 (1987) (“Vigilance is necessary to ensure
public employers do not use authority over employees to silence discourse.”).
216. 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
217. Brief for Petitioner, Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979) (No. 77-
1051), 1978 WL 206674, at *4-6 (detailing the teacher’s complaints); see Schauer, supra note
199, at 219 (“On frequent occasions during the 1970-71 school year Givhan objected to various
practices within the school. Primarily, she contended that racial segregation existed in the
appointment and assignment of nonprofessional employees such as administrative and
clerical staff and lunchroom workers.”).
218. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
219. See id. at 568, 572 (discussing the rights of teachers to speak out on matters of public
discourse).
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that private business owners should have the economic liberty to
hire whomever they wish, even if they use race as a criterion.220
Given the EEOC’s mission of combating racial discrimination in
employment, the agency should be permitted to infer from this
statement that the employee is not suitable for his job. Even if his
periodic performance reviews do not indicate any workplace prob-
lems, his speech provides an independent source of evidence about
his dedication and likely conduct in pursuit of the EEOC’s organiza-
tional objectives. The analysis changes if we alter the hypothetical
to make the employee a file clerk at the Treasury Department. In
the revised scenario, there is a much stronger argument that the
employee’s statement does not provide a lawful basis for discipline.
Unlike the EEOC, the Treasury Department is not charged with
enforcing laws against racial discrimination in employment.
Although the Treasury Department might prefer employees who
personally oppose any use of race in hiring—just as the government-
as-sovereign might prefer a similar mindset among all citizens—the
contrary belief does not necessarily conflict with the institutional
mission of the Treasury Department.
Concerns about viewpoint discrimination and ideological coercion
are pervasive in the law of free speech, and they must be taken
seriously.221 So, too, must the related principle that citizens
220. 483 U.S. 378, 400-01 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
221. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664 (2011) (“The First
Amendment requires heightened scrutiny whenever the government creates ‘a regulation of
speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.’” (quoting Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989))); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994)
(framing the question as whether “the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate
regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or information or manipulate the public
debate”); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 530 (1958) (Black, J., concurring) (“We should
never forget that the freedoms secured by [the First] Amendment ... are absolutely
indispensable for the preservation of a free society in which government is based upon the
consent of an informed citizenry and is dedicated to the protection of the rights of all, even the
most despised minorities.”); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 (1943)
(“It is now a commonplace that censorship or suppression of expression of opinion is tolerated
by our Constitution only when the expression presents a clear and present danger of action
of a kind the State is empowered to prevent and punish.”); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 112 (1980) (“If the First Amendment is even to begin
to serve its central function of assuring an open political dialogue and process, we must seek
to minimize assessment of the dangerousness of the various messages people want to
communicate.”); id. at 114 (“[M]uch valuable free speech, speech that has awakened the public
to outrages it had previously been taking for granted, very likely was of a sort that many
would have found offensive.”); Rosenthal, supra note 55, at 542 (“Absent the most compelling
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generally should not be punished for thoughts and beliefs that are
not manifested in unlawful action.222 One might draw on these
considerations to argue that even an employee whose off-the-clock
speech contradicts his employer’s mission should be protected from
discipline unless there is some other evidence to cast doubt upon his
fitness. As noted, however, a government employee is situated dif-
ferently from other citizens on matters of institutional mission.223
Implicit in the existence of goal-driven government institutions is
the authority to ensure satisfactory employee performance in
pursuit of legitimate institutional objectives.224 The managerial
assessments necessary to evaluate professional performance may
encompass an employee’s words as well as his acts; both provide
relevant evidence of his likely contribution to the employer’s pur-
suits.225 When an employee’s expressions suggest a lack of com-
mitment to the mission he was hired to assist in promoting, his
employer should not be forced to search for additional evidence of a
performance problem whose existence it can already reasonably
infer.
Though concerns about viewpoint discrimination do not under-
mine the relevance of institutional mission, they serve as a useful
reminder of the need for sensitivity. Resolving disputes over em-
ployee speech will often require exploring the unique mission of a
circumstances, discrimination against disfavored ideas or viewpoints is almost never tolerated
under the First Amendment.”); Frederick Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, in
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 29, 35-36 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005) (“If
government may not under the First Amendment distinguish between Republicans and
Communists ... then the government may not, so American First Amendment doctrine insists,
distinguish between espousals of racial equality and espousals of racial hatred.”).
222. Cf. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011) (noting the “danger”
that “the ideas expressed by speech—whether it be violence, or gore, or racism—and not its
objective effects, may be the real reason for governmental proscription”); Speiser, 357 U.S. at
536-37 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“Advocacy which is in no way brigaded with action should
always be protected by the First Amendment. That protection should extend even to the ideas
we despise.... It is time for government—state or federal—to become concerned with the
citizen’s advocacy when ideas and beliefs move into the realm of action.”); Post, Racist Speech,
supra note 81, at 291 (“In a democracy, as Piaget notes, ‘there are no more crimes of opinion,
but only breaches of procedure. All opinions are tolerated so long as their protagonists urge
their acceptance by legal methods.’” (quoting JEAN PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE
CHILD 57 (M. Gabain trans., 1948))).
223. See supra notes 128, 192 and accompanying text.
224. See supra text accompanying note 124.
225. See Rosenthal, supra note 22, at 46-47 (discussing the need to evaluate employees’
speech to determine whether it contributes to achieving work place objectives).
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particular government institution rather than relying on global,
across-the-board assessments.226 Those explorations must occur
despite the Supreme Court’s reluctance, which commentators
including Fred Schauer have noted,227 to focus on institutional
distinctions in the course of articulating and applying First
Amendment principles.228
226. As Lawrence Rosenthal has put it, there must be “an examination of the objectives of
the institution at issue to assess whether the type of content or viewpoint discrimination at
issue is a proper incident to institutional objectives.” Id. at 90; cf. Post, Racist Speech, supra
note 81, at 325 (“[T]he constitutionality of restraints on racist speech within public
universities will depend to a very great extent upon the educational purposes that we
constitutionally attribute to public institutions of higher learning, and upon the various
modalities through which such institutions are understood to pursue those purposes.”).
227. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Institutions as Legal and Constitutional Categories, 54
UCLA L. REV. 1747, 1755 (2007) (“Throughout First Amendment doctrine, it is the speech and
not the speaker that generally matters, and, accordingly, obvious institutional differences
among types of speakers are routinely ignored, including those institutional differences whose
recognition might well serve important First Amendment values and purposes.”); Schauer,
supra note 172, at 116 (“[G]iving certain institutions special First Amendment status ... would
require the Court to inquire much more deeply into the specific character of the institution,
and the functions it serves, than it has been willing to do.” (footnote omitted)).
228. The Supreme Court has begun exploring the relevance to government employment of
one type of belief: political ideology, especially as reflected through party affiliation. See Rutan
v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 65 (1990); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 508 (1980);
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 349 (1976). It has instructed that party affiliation is a
permissible basis for employment actions only with respect to “certain high-level employees”
who tend to hold—but need not always hold—confidential or policymaking roles. Rutan, 497
U.S. at 74; accord Branti, 445 U.S. at 518 (“[I]t is not always easy to determine whether a
position is one in which political affiliation is a legitimate factor to be considered. Under some
circumstances, a position may be appropriately considered political even though it is neither
confidential nor policymaking in character.... It is equally clear that party affiliation is not
necessarily relevant to every policymaking or confidential position.” (citation omitted)). The
ambiguity of this standard has led to sharp criticism. See, e.g., Rutan, 497 U.S. at 92 (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (“Today the Court establishes the constitutional principle that party
membership is not a permissible factor in the dispensation of government jobs, except those
jobs for the performance of which party affiliation is an ‘appropriate requirement.’”). The
Court’s recognition that party affiliation provides a lawful criterion for at least some
employment actions, combined with the unique history of patronage practices going back to
the country’s founding, leads me to think the patronage cases are best understood as
presenting a one-off problem whose solution is informed by, but not necessarily dictated by,
the general framework for determining the First Amendment protection of government-
employee speech. See, e.g., id. at 96 (“[P]atronage was, without any thought that it could be
unconstitutional, a basis for government employment from the earliest days of the Republic
until Elrod.”); Elrod, 427 U.S. at 353 (“Patronage practice is not new to American politics. It
has existed at the federal level at least since the Presidency of Thomas Jefferson, although
its popularization and legitimation primarily occurred later, in the Presidency of Andrew
Jackson.” (footnotes omitted)); id. at 376 (Powell, J., dissenting) (describing patronage as “a
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Few institutions will pose a greater challenge than the public
schools.229 As illustrated by cases like Pickering and Givhan, the
judiciary is regularly called upon to define the expressive rights of
educators.230 Parity theory demonstrates that resolving these cases
will often require an antecedent discussion about schools’ legitimate
institutional missions,231 including the recognition that schools at
different educational levels may themselves have missions that
vary in significant respects.232 The crux of the problem is the extent
to which schools may endorse and transmit preferred normative
values,233 as opposed to presenting themselves as receptive to all
ideological viewpoints. Note that even this latter approach is not
truly “neutral.” A school’s decision to tolerate expressions it per-
ceives as wrong or harmful may reflect, for example, a vision of
practice as old as the Republic, a practice which has contributed significantly to the
democratization of American politics”). For present purposes, I set aside those cases, as well
as United States Civil Service Commission v. National Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548
(1973), which dealt with political campaigning by federal employees, to focus on employee
speech more broadly.
229. Cf., e.g., Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 493 (1952) (“A teacher works in a
sensitive area in a schoolroom. There he shapes the attitude of young minds towards the
society in which they live.”); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943)
(“Probably no deeper division of our people could proceed from any provocation than from
finding it necessary to choose what doctrine and whose program public education officials
shall compel youth to unite in embracing.”).
230. Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ.,
391 U.S. 563 (1968); see also, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Adler, 342
U.S. 485; Wales v. Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 82 (7th Cir. 1997).
231. See Richard W. Garnett, Can There Really Be “Free Speech” in Public Schools?, 12
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 45, 47 (2008) (“Perhaps the most intriguing question posed by the
litigation, decision, and opinions in [Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007),] is one that the
various Justices who wrote in the case never squarely addressed: What is the ‘mission’—i.e.,
the ‘basic educational mission’—of public schools?” (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v.
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986))); id. at 56-57 (“It is precisely because education is really, in
the end, the process and craft of soul-making, and is as much about transmitting values and
loyalties to our children as it is about outfitting them with useful data and ‘skill sets,’ that we
care, argue, and even fight so much about it.”).
232. See Post, Racist Speech, supra note 81, at 323-24 (describing a vision of public
education at the university level whose “telos ... lies in the pursuit of truth” through
“unfettered freedom of ideas” along with “honesty, fidelity to reason, and respect for method
and procedures”); Schauer, supra note 172, at 117 (“[A] wide sociological, cultural, and
functional gulf exists between the primary or secondary school and the research university.”).
233. See MARK G. YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW 122 (4th ed. 2002) (“[I]f
the transmission of knowledge cannot be disentangled from socialization to values, who may
or must be allowed to shape the content and methods of the education effort, and what sort
of limitations, if any, are imposed by our laws and Constitution?”).
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public education as geared toward “the creation of autonomous
citizens, capable of fully participating in the rough and tumble
world of public discourse.”234 By comparison, an approach that treats
certain viewpoints as improper and unwelcome may suggest the
belief that public education is “a process of cultural reproduction,
whereby community values are authoritatively handed down to the
young.”235 
The parity-based model of employee speech requires candid
engagement with these fundamental tensions. In reviewing the im-
position of employment discipline resulting from a teacher’s public
remarks, the question should not be whether the statements
provoked disapproval from the listening public. Rather, a court
should consider whether the statements contradicted the school’s
legitimate institutional mission. If the answer is yes, the teacher
has provided a valid basis for doubting his fitness and performance.
If the answer is no, the teacher’s speech should be protected from
discipline, regardless of whether it caused a stir. In the latter sce-
nario there is no meaningful basis for treating the teacher differ-
ently than his peers in the general citizenry, who often create
disruptions that the government is required to tolerate. 
Disagreements over the proper role of public schools, as well as
the intersection of public education and individual expression, are
longstanding and multifaceted. The aim of this Article is not to
wade into them by advocating one approach over another. My
contention is that the mission of the schools should matter in re-
solving disputes over teachers’ speech. In other words, teachers’
First Amendment rights are necessarily derivative. A court cannot
determine the bounds of individual teachers’ expressive liberties on
issues such as politics, race, and sexuality until it understands the
appropriate role of the public schools in addressing such topics. The
same is true for employees of other governmental institutions.
It is fair to ask whether this sort of inquiry into the scope of
institutional mission is an undertaking properly committed to the
234. Post, Racist Speech, supra note 81, at 321; cf. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (“[S]tudents may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients
of only that which the State chooses to communicate.”).
235. Post, Racist Speech, supra note 81, at 319; see also id. (“The validity of those values
is largely taken for granted, and there is a strong tendency to use them as a basis for the
regulation of speech in the manner of the traditional common law.”).
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judiciary. For the reasons expressed, I view the assessment of
mission as an unavoidable element of adjudicating employee-speech
claims. As suggested by the examples above, relevant factors will
include the employer’s day-to-day operations, functional goals,
origins, and history. 
In the event that one perceives such matters as beyond the
competence of the courts, intermediate options are available. On the
one hand, courts might afford some degree of deference to an
institution’s own good-faith description of its mission.236 On the
other hand, courts might take a “least common denominator”
approach by confining the institutional mission to its absolute core:
for a school, the presentation of curricular materials but not the
transmission of any normative values; for a police department, the
evenhanded enforcement of the laws but not the promotion of
societal beliefs about the qualities of law enforcement officers; and
so on. Neither of these alternatives is perfect. The former risks
allowing too much employer control over speech while the latter
raises the opposite concern. But either approach would enhance the
doctrine’s theoretical coherence relative to the status quo by
preserving the essential link between institutional mission and the
scope of permissible restriction.
Along with this institutional focus, parity theory requires eval-
uation of the individual speaker’s status within an organization.
Though a teacher of political science may evince unsuitability for his
job through statements displaying a misunderstanding of “the
political philosophy of James Madison,”237 the calculus would be dif-
ferent if the speaker were a math teacher or clerical employee at the
same school. The legitimate evidentiary bearing of a speaker’s ex-
pressions on his fitness for employment will depend in part on the
speaker’s particular job. As the Supreme Court noted in Rankin v.
McPherson, in assessing the effects of employee speech on the
employer’s mission, “some attention must be paid to the responsibil-
ities of the employee within the agency.”238 There are many respects
236. In a forthcoming book, Paul Horwitz discusses the prospect of deference to various
institutional actors in advancing his theory of an institution-centric First Amendment. See
generally PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS (forthcoming 2012).
237. Feldman v. Ho, 171 F.3d 494, 496 (7th Cir. 1999).
238. 483 U.S. 378, 390 (1987); see also id. (“The burden of caution employees bear with
respect to the words they speak will vary with the extent of authority and public
accountability the employee’s role entails.”); id. at 391 (“We cannot believe that every
2012] FREE SPEECH AND PARITY 2035
in which a government institution’s mission will have common ap-
plication to all of its employees; the example above of an employee
announcing his entitlement to steal would put him at odds with his
employer’s mission no matter his specific role.239 In other cases,
however, gauging the evidentiary relevance of employee speech will
require inquiry into the individual speaker’s position and scope of
responsibilities.
D. Extra-Employment Speech
The utility of parity theory extends to one final question of
employee speech doctrine: how to treat speech that is made off the
clock and does not address work-related topics. For ease of refer-
ence, I refer to such expressions as extra-employment speech, with
the term indicating both physical and conceptual distance between
the expressions and the workplace.
Under existing law, off-the-clock speech that pertains to the
speaker’s employment is evaluated under the rubric set forth in
Pickering.240 The same analysis applies to speech that is unrelated
to the speaker’s employment but is uttered within the workplace.241
What is not entirely clear is how the First Amendment treats speech
that bears no connection, physical or conceptual, to the speaker’s
employment.242 As discussed above,243 in United States v. National
Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), the Supreme Court noted the
constitutional infirmities in a wide-ranging law that prohibited
federal employees from accepting compensation for speaking or
employee in Constable Rankin’s office, whether computer operator, electrician, or file clerk,
is equally required, on pain of discharge, to avoid any statement susceptible of being
interpreted by the Constable as an indication that the employee may be unworthy of
employment in his law enforcement agency.”). But cf. id. at 391 n.18 (“This is not to say that
clerical employees are insulated from discharge where their speech, taking the acknowledged
factors into account, truly injures the public interest in the effective functioning of the public
employer.”).
239. See supra text accompanying note 207.
240. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
241. See, e.g., Rankin, 483 U.S. at 381-83.
242. See Papandrea, supra note 3, at 2119 (“It is hardly clear from the Court’s own
jurisprudence that [the conventional framework] applies—or should apply—in cases involving
off-duty expression, especially when the expression is not work related.”); id. at 2139 (“The
lower courts disagree about whether and how to apply the public concern inquiry to off-duty
expressive activities as well as how to conduct the Pickering balancing test.”).
243. See supra notes 182-85 and accompanying text.
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writing.244 The Court emphasized that the prohibition extended even
to expressions having no “connection with the employee’s official
duties,”245 such as a mail handler’s “lectures on the Quaker re-
ligion.”246 This creep into nonemployment matters implicated
expressions “within the protected category of citizen comment on
matters of public concern.”247 
The Court addressed a related issue ten years later in City of San
Diego v. Roe, which arose from a police officer’s creation and distri-
bution of sexually explicit videos.248 The Court of Appeals ruled that
the videos implicated a matter of public concern.249 In so holding, it
emphasized that the videos were unrelated to the employee’s
workplace.250 The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that “[f]ar
from confining his activities to speech unrelated to his employment,”
the officer took “deliberate steps to link his videos and other wares
to his police work.”251
The language of NTEU and City of San Diego arguably suggests
that when expressions are truly removed from the speaker’s
employment, the conventional employee-speech calculus is altered
through the elimination of the public concern requirement.252 Some
244. 513 U.S. 454, 457 (1995).
245. Id.
246. Id. at 461.
247. Id. at 466; see also id. at 466-70; cf. id. at 464-65 (“Federal employees who write for
publication in their spare time have made significant contributions to the marketplace of
ideas. They include literary giants like Nathaniel Hawthorne and Herman Melville, who were
employed by the Customs Service; Walt Whitman, who worked for the Departments of Justice
and Interior; and Bret Harte, an employee of the Mint.”).
248. 543 U.S. 77, 78, 80-81 (2004) (per curiam); see also Part I.B.1.
249. See Roe v. City of San Diego, 356 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2004).
250. Id. at 1119-20.
251. City of San Diego, 543 U.S. at 81.
252. For further statements suggesting that extra-employment speech calls for its own
distinctive approach, see United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 480
(1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“In contrast
to some of our prior decisions, this case presents no threshold question whether the speech
is of public, or merely private, concern. Respondents challenge the ban as it applies to off-hour
speech bearing no nexus to Government employment—speech that by definition does not
relate to ‘internal office affairs’ or the employee’s status as an employee.” (quoting Connick
v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983))); id. at 485 (“We do not decide the question—a far harder
case for [the speakers], in my view—whether it is constitutional to apply the honoraria ban
to speech by this class that bears a relationship to Government employment.”); Connick, 461
U.S. at 153 n.13 (“Employee speech which transpires entirely on the employee’s own time, and
in nonwork areas of the office, bring [sic] different factors into the Pickering calculus, and
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commentators have gone further by suggesting that extra-employ-
ment speech is treated akin to speech by nonemployees.253 In any
event, the question has not been definitively resolved. More
importantly for present purposes, examining the issue reveals a
theoretical difficulty within the existing jurisprudence.
The problem begins with Pickering254 and what we might think
of as the Pickering paradox. In explaining its rationale for protect-
ing the teacher from retaliation based on his letter to the local
newspaper—which occurred outside the classroom but dealt with
school-related topics—the Court emphasized that government
workers possess unique expertise in matters related to their employ:
“Teachers are, as a class, the members of a community most likely
to have informed and definite opinions as to how funds allotted to
the operation of the schools should be spent.”255 That expertise
carries special power to advance the public debate, creating a strong
societal interest in ensuring that teachers’ expressions are pro-
tected.256 At the same time, the Pickering Court highlighted the
remoteness of the teacher’s statements from his employment, noting
that “the fact of employment [was] only tangentially and insubstan-
tially involved in the subject matter” of his letter.257 Thus, the fact
that the teacher’s employment was only “tangentially” connected to
might lead to a different conclusion.”).
253. See Estlund, supra note 22, at 1468 (“[A]t some point along the spectrum of work-
relatedness, the public employee apparently escapes the Connick-Pickering niche and recovers
her freedom as a citizen vis-à-vis the government.”); Secunda, supra note 3, at 688 (“Off-duty
public employee speech that has no relation to work (anti-Garcetti speech) does not come
under the Pickering framework and is protected much like normal citizen speech.”); see also
id. at 692 (“Given the complexity of the Pickering analysis, public employees may only expect
real constitutional protection when blogging if they blog on their personal computers outside
of work and in no way related to their work.”). But see Rosenthal, supra note 22, at 65 (“Public
employees who occupy a position of public trust can undermine that trust through off-duty
conduct that raises sufficiently serious doubts about their integrity or judgment.... In such
circumstances, managerial prerogative includes the right to control even off-duty speech that
could undermine the employee’s on-duty effectiveness.”). 
254. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
255. Id. at 572; see also id. at 568 (framing the central issue in the case as whether
teachers may be denied the right “to comment on matters of public interest in connection with
the operation of the public schools in which they work”). 
256. See id. at 571-72; see also Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2500 (2011)
(“Just as the public has a right to hear the views of public employees, the public has a right
to the benefit of those employees’ participation in petitioning activity.”).
257. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574.
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his expressions supported his appeal for constitutional protection.258
But so did his unique interest and expertise in the school system,
which he developed by being a teacher.259 It appears from Pickering
that increasing the conceptual distance between a speaker’s em-
ployment and his expressions both strengthens and weakens his
claim to First Amendment protection.
The question becomes which of these dueling propositions ought
to be embraced. Parity theory provides an answer, indicating that
constitutional protection should track the elements of similarity
between employees and other citizens. On the facts of a case like
Pickering, the critical feature is the disconnect between the
teacher’s speech and his employment duties. That disconnect left
him situated similarly to his nonemployee peers. Thus, notwith-
standing the tension within Pickering, parity theory reinforces the
view that an employee’s strongest claim to constitutional protection
arises when he most resembles his nonemployee peers.
To be sure, extra-employment speech that is controversial or
incendiary might sometimes generate costs even when it has no
bearing on an employee’s professional fitness as assessed in light of
his employer’s institutional mission. It does not follow that extra-
employment speech is automatically exempt from employer
discipline. Recast in terms of parity theory, the issue is whether an
employee’s statements provide a meaningful basis for treating him
differently than members of the general public. Expressions that
evince a speaker’s unfitness for employment satisfy this test,260
regardless of whether they are deemed to be related, unrelated, or
tangentially related to the speaker’s job. Questions inevitably will
arise as to how the bounds of the employer’s institutional mission
should be defined.261 That inquiry is a significant one, but it main-
tains the same dimensions regardless of whether the expressions in
question bear a superficial connection to the workplace. If speech
provides a valid basis for inferring that an employee is unsuitable
for his job,262 it should not be shielded simply because it occurred off-
258. Id.
259. Id. at 572.
260. For a more extensive discussion of the relevance of institutional mission, see supra
Part IV.C.
261. See supra Part IV.C.
262. See supra Part IV.C.
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the-clock and dealt with topics unrelated to his official duties.263 As
a result, distinguishing between extra-employment speech and
other expressions is unnecessary within a parity-based model. The
analytical focus remains the legitimate scope of the employer’s
institutional mission.264
In a thoughtful article, Helen Norton recently contemplated
whether certain public officials, such as police officers and school
teachers, are “so closely identified with their government employer”
that their personal views can never “be dissociated from those of the
government.”265 Building from that intuition, we might imagine
situations in which statements by government officials would create
detrimental effects for popular confidence in the public workforce
despite the lack of any connection between the statements and the
employers’ operational missions. By prohibiting disciplinary actions
in such circumstances, the parity-based approach admittedly would
require government entities, as well as society at large, to endure
certain costs. That consequence is unfortunate, but it is unremark-
able once employee-speech doctrine is situated within general First
Amendment principles, which commonly treat the harms resulting
from speech as the price of expressive liberty. Public reproach for
speech that is outside the scope of the employer’s mission provides
an insufficient basis for restriction, just as public reproach is
inadequate to justify governmental suppression in the ordinary
course of First Amendment law.
263. Thus, a parity-based approach would permit termination in a case like Melzer v. Board
of Education, in which a teacher engaged in off-the-clock speech in support of child
molestation. 336 F.3d 185, 188-89 (2d Cir. 2003). Regardless of whether such speech is
properly described as related to a teacher’s official duties, it would provide a reasonable basis
for managerial concerns abut ensuring student welfare, which is part of the institutional
mission of the public schools.
264. See supra Part IV.C.
265. Norton, supra note 22, at 54. Professor Norton ultimately advocates a more contextual
approach to the regulation of off-duty speech. See id. at 57 (“[A]n employee’s off-duty speech
that does not explicitly associate itself with the government employer should generally be
protected except in unusual circumstances” where the speech “actually undermined [the
employer’s] own ability to communicate its views effectively.”).
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CONCLUSION
This Article has introduced a parity-based theory of employee
speech founded on the presumption that government employees
should be treated similarly to other citizens absent a meaningful
ground of distinction beyond the bare fact of employment. The norm
of parity stands as the most natural successor to the once-dominant
Holmesian approach, which treated the employment relationship as
dispositive of First Amendment claims.
Applying the parity lens suggests that central elements of the
existing jurisprudence, including the public concern requirement
and the Pickering balance, are misguided. It also emphasizes the
need to confront two vital issues that have been neglected in the
Supreme Court’s case law: the relevance of institutional mission,
and the evidentiary value of expression.
